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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
DYSFUNCTIONAL USES OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE DETERMINANTS OF GAMING
BEHAVIOR
by
Shawn Lorenzo Benaine
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Alexander Kroll, Major Professor
The use of performance information in decision-making is central to the practice of
public management and is a common feature of modern governance (Kroll, 2015;
Moynihan, 2008). The purposeful use of performance information brings about many
benefits for public organizations, such as enhanced democratic accountability and
responsiveness, as well as improved managerial decision-making in the public interest.
However, there are dysfunctional uses of performance systems, such as performance
gaming. This is a behavior where organizations or individuals manipulate data or effort in
a way that undermines organizational goals. The dissertation seeks to understand what
factors mitigate performance gaming. Prior research in public administration has focused
heavily on system factors as the drivers of performance gaming. However, other social
science disciplines have examined behavioral characteristics. This dissertation draws on
these disciplines to make the argument that behavioral traits, particularly other-oriented
constructs (i.e., mission orientation and prosocial impact), have the potential to mitigate
performance gaming. The document consists of three essays: 1) a systematic literature
vi

review, 2) an observational study, using a five-year panel data set of high schools, and 3)
a two-part, randomized, experimental study, using a sample of general population
participants and a sample of public managers (school leaders). The findings show that
other-oriented constructs, such as mission orientation and prosocial impact, do mitigate
performance gaming. Specifically, mission orientation reduces the effect of performance
gaming when organizations have demanding tasks. Prosocial impact lessens performance
gaming when public managers give more attention to performance data or when they are
less experienced. This dissertation contributes to theory by highlighting the importance of
other-oriented constructs for performance gaming behavior within public organizations.
For example, performance information use among citizens and decision-makers can be
different in many ways, such as performance gaming is affected by the role of
beneficiaries or the time spent. It also contributes to public management practice by
providing recommendations for decision-making based on the influence of other-oriented
constructs. The findings have broader implications for the welfare of the general public,
including directions for future research on performance gaming’s effect on historically
disadvantaged groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose of the Study

In this section, I will first explain why the topic of performance gaming is
important to public administration. Then, I will explain the central concepts of
performance gaming and the main variables of interest, which are the other-oriented
constructs of mission orientation and prosocial impact. Finally, I will conclude this
section by explaining the research question and discussing the purpose of the study.
1.1.1 Importance of the topic
When organizations measure their performance, and use these measures to make
decisions, they reap many benefits (Hatry, 2007). In public organizations, the benefits
include accountability to the public through performance reports, which provide
transparency in how the government makes decisions. The performance literature offers a
vast amount of empirical support for the benefits of performance systems (Moynihan &
Beazley, 2016; Van de Walle, 2009; Van Dooren et al., 2015). But there are also many
problems with performance systems, referred to as system dysfunctions. These include
system design issues that fail to genuinely capture organizational performance (Heinrich
& Marschke, 2010) and minimal or nonuse of performance information (Van Dooren &
Van de Walle, 2008), where data collection is a mere box to be checked by managers
with no consequences for decision-making. But most importantly, and the topic of this
dissertation, is a dysfunction of performance systems known as performance gaming.
This is a perverse form of information use (Moynihan, 2009), where the intent is to
1

distort performance measures, usually to meet a target. Performance gaming is important
for both practical and theoretical reasons. From the practical perspective, the detrimental
effects of performance gaming have been well-documented with storied examples, such
as the hospital wait-times scandal that wreaked havoc in the U.S. Veteran’s Affairs
Department in 2014 or the cheating scandal in the public school systems of Atlanta and
Washington, D.C., which occurred in 2009 and 2018, respectively. In the Veteran’s
Affairs Department scandal, public managers, under pressure to meet targets,
manipulated hospital wait-times to make it appear that military veterans were receiving
medical care in a timely manner (Oppel, Jr. & Shear, 2014). D.C. public school officials
fudged graduation numbers to make it appear that high school students had earned
diplomas, when in fact they had not (Jamison, 2018). In Atlanta Public Schools,
administrators and teachers cheated on the state standardized test by erasing or changing
answers (Blinder, 2015). In the New York City Police Department, whistleblowers
complained about ticket quota systems that forced them to meet ticket performance
targets (Rose, 2015). Many of the public servants in these cases faced criminal charges
and some were convicted. The obvious consequences were a loss of public trust, an
erosion of democratic accountability, and the most serious consequence: vulnerable
groups not receiving the needed services. Thus, from a practical perspective, the issue of
performing gaming is important because of its effects on the public and important
government institutions.
For organizational theorists and management scholars, the issue of performing
gaming is important because of implications for how organizations and managers make
decisions. In most organizations, dysfunctional behaviors have generally been either
2

taboo or fallen under a gray area of ethical uncertainty, making it difficult for scholars to
judiciously examine these behaviors or for practitioners to identify their actual effects on
decision-making and organizational effectiveness. Studying performance gaming within
managerial decision-making also contributes to our understanding of how organizations
could enhance the benefits they provide to the public. To sum, the issue of performing
gaming is important for public management theory, organizational behavior, and, in
practice, has the potential to benefit the general public.

1.1.2 Definition of Central Concepts
The central concept that this dissertation examines is performance gaming, a
behavior which involves generating positive performance data without achieving the
actual objective behind the indicator (Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Moynihan, 2009;
Smith, 1995). Performance gaming encompasses improving “measures in ways that are in
conflict with the underlying or unmeasured goals of a program” (Moynihan, 2009, p.
593). In exploring the factors of performance gaming, this dissertation takes a different
approach from previous research by looking at particular factors that are not found in
performance system designs. These factors can be described as other-oriented constructs.
These concepts are embedded in the idea of altruism, that is, helping others. Public
organizations fit well into the conversation on other-oriented constructs because there is
plenty of literature on public service motivation and the propensity for public
administrators to have a stronger disposition for serving the public compared to their
private counterparts (Pandey & Stazyk, 2008; Perry, 1996). Other-oriented constructs are
centered on a concern for others (Bolino & Grant, 2016; Korsgaard et al., 1996).
3

Examples include prosociality, public service motivation, mission orientation, and
organizational citizenship behavior. I explore two other-oriented constructs—prosociality
and mission orientation—to determine whether they are likely to reduce performance
gaming. Prosociality is a three-prong stream centered on how individuals help others
through their work (Bolino & Grant, 2016). It is comprised of prosocial motives,
prosocial behavior, and prosocial impact. This dissertation is concerned with prosocial
impact, which is the experience individuals feel when they know someone has benefited
from their work (Bolino & Grant, 2016). The second concept, mission orientation, serves
as a motivation for organizational behavior and is based on purposes that are focused on
serving others (Brewster & Cerdin, 2018). While all organizations have a mission, public
and nonprofit organizations have missions that are generally focused on serving the
public and providing for the welfare of others. I define mission orientation as the degree
to which organizations are focused on their mission, a purpose that is generally prosocial
(Knies & Leisink, 2018; Moore, 1995). These other-oriented constructs provide an
alternative explanation for understanding the relationship between public managers in
performance management systems and other stakeholders and how they use performance
information. Rather than depending heavily on self-interest as the driving motivational
force of performance information use, other-oriented constructs show that users of
information are motivated by prosocial and mission-driven mechanisms.
1.1.3 Research question: What are the determinants of performance gaming?
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify predictors of performance gaming –
why does this behavior occur and what can be done to minimize such behavior. This
dissertation examines performance gaming in public organizations because public
4

organizations compared to private ones benefit and function differently (specifically
along the lines of for-profit private enterprises). The difference also extends to the area of
performance systems. Performance systems allow for the benefits of democratic
accountability, transparency, and ultimately improved service for the public (Van Dooren
et al., 2015). Understanding dysfunctions of performance system in the public sector has
implications for historically disadvantaged groups, who become doubly disadvantaged
under dysfunctional performance regimes (Soss et al., 2011).

1.2 State of the Literature and Research Gaps

In the performance management literature within public administration,
performance gaming has generally been studied as a function of performance system
flaws or system pressure (Courty & Marschke, 2007; Hood 2006). Public servants learn
performance systems and then game the system based on knowledge of loopholes and
ways to cut corners (Courty & Marschke, 2007). Often, there are targets to meet or
ranking systems by which individuals or organizations are compared to one another,
which creates pressure to perform or outperform other units (Bevan & Hood, 2006).
These pressures and system loopholes often lead to performance gaming (Boyne & Chen,
2007). The public administration literature of performance gaming has not examined
other-oriented constructs, such as prosociality and mission-orientation, and their role in
reducing performance gaming. This dissertation fills this gap by drawing on other social
science disciplines. Because performance gaming falls under the broad scope of
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performance management, it is important to examine how this dissertation fits into this
stream of literature.
1.2.1 Principal-Agent Theory and Performance Gaming
The major theory of performance management is principal-agent theory. Also
called agency theory, it rests on the premise that agents (public managers, to use one
context of government) and principals (elected officials) have differing perspectives and
are motivated by self-interest (Moynihan, 2008). Seminal work for agency theory was
first proposed by Barry Mitnick and Stephen Ross at around the same time in the early
1970s. Ross (1973) proposed the theory in terms of economics, describing the situation as
an issue with incentives for an agent and how best to maximize those incentives.
Therefore, Ross’s theory rests on an optimal incentive system. Mitnick (1975) proposed
an institutional perspective of agency theory, where institutions must manage and even
adapt to the relationship of agents and principals. According to Mitnick, understanding of
institutional structures are important to the principal-agent relationship. The origination
of agency-theory on the behavior of actors within the firm itself rests with the influential
work of Jensen & Meckling (1976), who proposed that agents do not maximize a firm’s
return, situation referred to as agency loss, and incentives must be included by the
principal in order to alleviate this loss.
As the theory developed, information became critical to determining incentive
systems. Agents will use information asymmetry to keep principals in the dark, being
selective in the provision of information. Therefore, principals must invest in monitoring
systems and to contract on the agent’s behavior or the outcome that the agent produces
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A key assumption of information asymmetry is that agents are self6

interested, thus the need for monitoring systems and incentives (Perrow, 1986). This is a
very interesting point of the theory for organizational scholars and particularly those who
study public organizations because of the nature of serving the public.
Agency theory has generally neglected the fact that altruistic values may alter the
relationship between principals and agents. However, there is increasing research to
suggest that other-oriented constructs, such as prosociality, the concept of an individual
benefiting others, usually through the individual’s work, may play an important role in
the principal-agent relationship (Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010).
My theory expands on the principal-agent framework, by saying that agents are not
entirely utility maximizers. Some agents, particularly in mission-driven organizations (or
from their own predisposition) are prosocial maximizers. To some extent, they are
looking to maximize their own utility, but to some extent they are looking to help others.
So, this is an enhanced version of the principal-agent theory. Critics of the traditional
form of agency theory have proposed that when principals depend on incentivized
performance management systems, they are unable to prevent gaming the incentive
measures and they also do not account for other motivations not captured by the incentive
systems (Le Grand, 2006; Moynihan, 2010; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloth, 2010).
My dissertation tests this expansive approach to principal-agent theory and
addresses the criticisms of the traditional theory. Empirical tests of the alternative agency
theories, which incorporate altruism instead of self-interest, include bureaucrats who are
motivated by policy (Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Moynihan et al., 2012), which examines
prosociality as a variable that affects performance information use. In the next section, I
address mission orientation as an other-oriented construct.
7

1.2.2 The Theory of Mission Orientation
Along with prosociality, mission-orientation is part of the expansive view to
agency theory explained in this dissertation. The literature on mission-orientation has
quite meaningful empirical findings and theory building for organizational behavior and
performance. An organization’s mission statement offers a window into understanding
the purpose and direction of an organization as seen by its founders and leadership
(Weiss & Piderit, 1999). Often using content analysis of mission statements and vision
statements, researchers have concluded that mission statements can shape organizational
behavior (Weiss & Piderit, 1999; Garrow & Gursky, 2013), though other studies have
shown a disconnect between mission and vision statements and day-to-day functions
(Abelman et al., 2007; Schafft & Biddle, 2013). Researchers have also made correlations
between mission and performance outputs (Boyne & Chen, 2007; Chun & Rainey, 2005;
Garrow & Gursky, 2013), and have also made distinctions between different types of
mission-orientation, finding a philosophical distinction to be an important type of
mission-orientation (Boerema, 2006; Henig et al., 2005).
Probably the most significant piece of knowledge within the literature on missionorientation is how scholars have determined the types of mission. Mission-oriented
organizations can be distinguished based on their distinct philosophical beliefs. Albert
Boerema (2006) called this a school’s distinctive belief and he found that among private
schools, there was considerable diversity along this dimension compared to three other
themes that were studied. Among charter schools, Brown et al. (2004) identified one of
two strands that fit under the scope of a specific mission-orientation. They described
autonomy and decentralized control as the first strand of mission-oriented schools. And
8

they identified a specific philosophical approach as the second strand. In the distinct
philosophical mission-orientation strand, teachers and families are united by a mission
based on a “set of animating values” that may be specific to the process of delivering
education, such as a “back-to-the-basics approach—but they may also have their roots in
racial, ethnic, or religious identity” (Brown et al., 2004, p. 1038). The typology of a
distinct philosophical mission-orientation is empirically tested by Henig et al. (2005), and
they conclude with two broad types of organizations: market-oriented and missionoriented. They find limited differences among the various types of mission-oriented
organizations, but a distinct difference between market and what they call more mission
or purpose-driven organizations.
From their research, a mission-orientation (or a market one for that matter) is
based on the perspectives of the founders – the philosophy, values, and traditions of the
founders are formulated in the mission. In this dissertation, I expand on the founder’s
philosophy as a mission-orientation type and also look at who the specific clients are in
identifying a specific mission from a general mission. This is because who or what is
being served are important dimensions of a mission (Brown et al., 2004; Garrow &
Gursky, 2013). Henig et al. (2005) identified differences in mission-oriented
organizations and found that service to specific high-need populations were a defining
feature of community-based mission-oriented organizations. So, even in their study,
understanding the specific target groups are important dimensions of mission-orientation.

9

1.2.3 Conclusion of Theoretical Foundation
Prosociality and mission-orientation are other-oriented constructs that provide
alternative explanations to principal-agent theory, the traditional theory that explains
performance management and information use. For public organizations, the theories of
prosociality and mission-orientation are consistent with other similar theories, such as
public service motivation (Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise 2010). In public organizations,
individuals are said to have greater dispositions for motivations to serve the public (Perry
& Wise 1990). This section provided a detailed explanation of the theoretical
underpinning of my dissertation. In the following sections, I summarize my three essays
and how I tested these theories as explanation for dysfunctional uses of performance
information.

1.3 Argument of the Dissertation

The main argument of my dissertation is that other-oriented constructs, such as
mission orientation and prosocial impact, are inversely associated with performance
gaming, meaning that they tend to decrease the undesirable effects of the factors that lead
to this dysfunction. This dissertation points scholars of public management and
organizational behavior into a different perspective on dysfunctional use of performance
information. The models that we use to understand performance systems should include
more than just system factors and organizational variables, but also these other-oriented

10

constructs. This section explains these other-oriented constructs in detail and the
foundation for the main argument of my dissertation.
1.3.1 The Behavioral Perspective for Understanding Performance Gaming
Traditionally, public administration scholars have focused on system factors as
antecedents of performance gaming. Targets and ranking systems are influential
determinants of gaming behavior (Bevan & Hood, 2006), as well as system loopholes
that allow performance systems to be learned and gamed (Courty & Marschke, 2007).
Other predictors include the maturity level of the performance system (Courty et al.,
2005), systemic issues or flaws in system measurements (Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith,
2002; Kelman & Friedman, 2009), and organizational variables such as task demands
(Bothe & Meier, 2000). In other social science disciplines, predictors of performance
gaming and unethical behavior have been at the individual level and have taken a more
behavioral perspective. These other social science disciplines have shed light on
antecedents that the public administration literature should give more attention to.
Other-oriented constructs, such as mission-orientation and prosociality, are
avenues that may provide a vast array of knowledge in understanding organizational
behavior that the public administration has overlooked. This dissertation argues that the
performance gaming literature is void of these antecedents and can benefit from this
behavioral perspective and the micro-level processes that lead to decision-making in
performance systems.

11

1.3.2 Mission-Orientation in Public Organizations
All organizations have missions or some purpose for which they exist (Brewster
& Cerdin, 2018), but public and nonprofit organizations will differ from private, forprofit firms in the premise of their mission. On the one hand, for-profit organizations will
generally have a profit motive for their mission, while nonprofit and public organizations
will have a purpose of serving some specific goal or the public interest. The term,
mission, in this dissertation is based on the definition of mission pertaining to public and
nonprofit organizations. Mission in this sense is a purpose that is other-oriented, or
serving someone other than oneself. The mission-orientation examined in this dissertation
is done at the organizational level and is a measure of how inclined organizations are to
the idea of serving others. The premise for this argument is that research has shown
strong prosocial motives give individuals and teams a strong sense of purpose and allow
them to lean to behave prosocially, behavior done for the benefit of others (Korsgaard et
al., 1997).
1.3.3 Prosocial Impact and Visualizations of Performance Data
The second other-oriented construct that this dissertation examines is prosocial
impact, which is part of a three-prong stream that centers on helping others. The threeprongs are prosocial motives, prosocial behavior, and prosocial impact. Prosocial impact
is the experience that individuals receive from knowing their work has benefited someone
else (Bolino & Grant, 2016). I argue that prosocial impact and individual characteristics
(such as experience and attention to information) frame how individuals visualize and
process impact information, which in turn reduce performance gaming. The basis for this
12

argument is that previous studies have examined the framing effects of performance data
and prosocial impact (Belle, 2013a; Grant 2008a; Olsen, 2017).
Studies have shown that prosociality has many positive outcomes, such as
increased productivity among workers and higher levels of motivation, as well as greater
accuracy in work. Prosocial behavior is tied to the idea of working for the public interest
(Wright et al., 2016) and if performance gaming prevents individuals from, high levels of
prosocial impact will likely lead to reductions in dysfunction behavior. This theory fills a
gap in the performance management literature overall because of the need to better
explain principal-agent theory. Researchers have called for an expanded view of agency
theory that explains how individuals use information in performance systems (Kettl,
1997; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). Prosociality is an other-oriented construct that can
help explain such behavior such as performance gaming. And it also emphasizes the
importance of individual actors in the agency model, because individual characteristics
are still vital to explaining gaming behavior.
The complete argument is that prosocial impact, as an interaction with other
characteristics (attention to data and experience with data), explains performance gaming.
So, prosociality makes up the second of the two other-oriented constructs that predict
performance gaming. The next section sums of the main argument for this dissertation,
situating the argument in the context of the behavioral perspective.
1.3.4 Summary of the Main Argument
This dissertation examines performance gaming and takes an alternative approach
to studying factors that can mitigate performance gaming. In particular, I take a
behavioral perspective by studying two types of other-oriented constructs: mission13

orientation and prosocial impact and how these can reduce performance gaming in public
organizations. The basis of my argument comes from a literature review of the
performance gaming and unethical behavior literature of other social science disciplines
and public administration. In my comparative review, I learn that public administration
has largely focused on technical and system factors as determinants of performance
gaming. Other social science disciplines have mainly focused on individual
characteristics. So, I argue in my literature review that there is an opportunity for new
directions in studying performance gaming where we can take a behavioral approach and
look at other-oriented constructs. This fits in with research that has argued for an
altruistic explanation of the principal-agent theory (Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Moynihan et
al., 2012), where agents are not motivated by self-interest, but a desire to serve others.
This is not entirely new to public administration, in the sense that scholars have long
observed the benefits of these constructs, such as organizational citizenship behavior
(Vigoda-Gadot & Beeri, 2011) and public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990). But
it is novel in the study of performance systems and is part of a new wave of public
administration scholarship that is taking on a behavioral perspective (Marvel, 2015;
Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017; Olsen, 2015). This behavioral approach of public
administration looks at the micro-level processes, as well as cognitive constructs “and it
draws strongly both from psychological theories and from the experimental approach
favored by that discipline” (Moynihan, 2018, p.1). This dissertation is part of this wave of
behavioral perspective and makes the argument that performance gaming can be
mitigated by such factors.
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1.4 Approach of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of three essays: 1) a literature review 2) a longitudinal,
observational study and 3) an experimental study (the observational paper and literature
review have been published in peer review journals). I chose this three-essay format
because it allowed me to conduct multiple studies that were part of the overall research
question and thus made for a stronger overall argument. The three essays have not only
been reviewed by my dissertation committee, but also gone through the blind review
process of academic journals, thus allowing additional experts in the field to review. This
is related to the triangulation method of research that allows for increased reliability
when the same phenomenon is studied from several angles and involves review by
multiple researchers. “Through triangulation (using data sources, methods, theories, or
researchers), the validity of specific knowledge claims is argued to be more robust”
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 48).
Each chapter of essays is different in its sample, unit of analysis, method, and
specific research question studied. But each essay is similar in that it is part of the
broader and main argument of the dissertation. For example, the unit of analysis for the
first essay (the literature review) is journal articles and the method is a systematic review.
The second essay focuses on public organizations (schools) as the unit of analysis and
uses pooled OLS regression as the method. The third essay has public managers and a
general population of individuals as the unit of analysis. The method is a randomized
experimental approach, using OLS regression. The overlap and similarities are that each
study focuses on performance gaming as the phenomenon of interest, though each essay
looks at different types of performance gaming. For example, the first essay looks at
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various forms of performance gaming and unethical behavior, across different social
science disciplines. The second and third essay looks at specific types of performance
gaming, effort substitution and cream skimming, respectively. The main overlap of all the
articles is that it looks at behavioral and other-oriented characteristics as the main
independent variables of interest. This makes up the chief argument of the dissertation –
that other-oriented constructs mitigate performance gaming.
I used several methodological approaches for each of the three essays. The first
essay uses the methodological approach of a systematic review, with two criteria for
articles to be included in the review: 1) an empirical study and 2) performance gaming or
cheating behavior was the outcome variable. This approach was necessary because I
wanted to learn what antecedents had been empirically studied for performance gaming.
The second essay used publicly available on 64 high schools in one specific school
district over a five-year period (2012-2016). This approach was chosen because schools
have very mature performance systems and focusing on one school district allowed for
separating system effects from organizational-level variables. The years were chosen
because they were the most recent years for which data were available at the time of the
study. The methodology for the third study involved a randomized, experimental study
consisting of a general population sample and a sample of public managers. An
experimental study was a necessary approach because I wanted to isolate the treatment
(impact information) and see whether this treatment had an effect on how individuals
gamed performance.
Public administrators in the education sector have a long-standing experience with
performance systems. In Florida, for example, school districts have used performance
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systems since the 1990s, even before the state created its school accountability system
(Florida Department of Education, 2017). Therefore, public administrators are familiar
with the performance pressures presented in the experimental study. Schools in the
district I examined were ideal for the observational study because the school district was
a pioneer of performance monitoring in the state of Florida, as evidenced by performance
data available on their web pages, which predates the state’s performance system.
Figure 1 is a visual representation of my dissertation approach and shows how
each essay chapter is linked and how each chapter supports the overall research question
and the dissertation’s main argument. The literature review chapter provides the
foundational support for the subsequent chapters and the dissertation’s main argument.
This main argument is that public administration should expand its focus and look at
other-oriented constructs as mitigating performance gaming. Across all three chapters,
two key themes appear 1) performance gaming is the key variable of interest and 2)
other-oriented constructs are mitigating factors that provide for a behavioral perspective
of examining performance system dysfunctions. Each chapter then decomposes these
themes, with the two major studies of my dissertation focusing on a specific type of
gaming and a specific other-oriented construct. In the next section, I will summarize each
chapter of my dissertation. Then, I will conclude the introduction of the dissertation and
introduce each essay and the essay themselves. At the end of the essays, I will provide a
conclusion and bring each of the essays together for a summative conclusion on how each
chapter is linked.
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Figure 1. The relationship between chapters

1.5 Explanation of the Three Essays

My dissertation comprises of three essays, which include a systematic literature
review of performance gaming and two empirical studies. The systematic review
compares the performance gaming literature of public administration to that of other
social science disciplines in order to draw lessons for research. The second empirical
essay is a randomized, experimental research that consists of two studies. Study 1 uses a
general population sample and study 2 uses a sample of public managers, where I study
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the effects of prosocial impact on performance gaming through different visualizations of
performance data. The final section of my dissertation is the conclusion where I conduct
a synthesis of the two empirical essays to build the case for the importance of otheroriented constructs. Using the findings from my empirical studies, I provide a response to
the problem statement described earlier: public organizations are plagued by
dysfunctional consequences of performance systems, such as performance gaming and it
is important to understand what factors can minimize this behavior. In the three following
sections, I will provide a more detailed summary of my three essays.

The primary problem that my dissertation addresses is understanding the factors
that mitigate dysfunctional consequence of performance systems, particularly
performance gaming. I observe this behavior in public organizations as oppose to private
or quasi-public entities. The publicness demarcation is an important one because of two
main reasons: 1) public organizations benefit from appropriately functioning performance
systems in a very unique way compared to private firms (Moynihan, 2008; Van Dooren,
& Van de Walle, 2008), and 2) I take a very different set of performance gaming
antecedents compared to previous research on public organizations, where the
antecedents have been system-related drivers (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Bohte & Meier,
2000; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010).
First, public organizations are unique in the benefits they receive from
performance systems primarily because public agencies are induced to “become more
efficient, responsive, and accountable to the public” (Heckman et al., 2011, p.1). This
benefit of democratic accountability comes through transparency in performance reports
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and responsiveness in budget allocations (Heckman et al., 2011). This ultimately results
in the appropriate allocation of resources and informative decision-making for the
public’s benefit. These benefits are based on the assumption that performance
measurement in such systems are accurate and aligned with organizational goals. When
this is compromised because of dysfunctional behavior, then the benefits of democratic
accountability and the public welfare are compromised (Yang, 2009). The second reason
why my dissertation is unique for public organizations is because it is different from
previous research in public administration.
In most of the performance gaming literature in public administration, the
antecedent of performance gaming are system-related factors (Bevan & Hood, 2006;
Radin, 2000). These include targets, where the pressure to reach a preset threshold makes
gaming the system attractive (Bevan & Hood, 2006). System-related factors also include
system dynamism, where static systems can easily be learned and then gamed (Heinrich,
2007). Incentivized systems have been linked to performance gaming because
performance outcomes tied to rewards result in pressures to attain these outcomes
(Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Kelman & Friedman, 2009). These are the antecedents that
scholars have usually observed when they have examined performance gaming in public
organizations. However, in other social science fields, the focus has been a more
behavioral perspective that settles on individual drivers as the antecedents of performance
gaming (Gino et al., 2009; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). The unit of analysis in these other
disciplines is often individuals and the methodical approach is usually experimental.
Public organizations are not usually examined in these other fields. Usually graduate
students are used or participants from the general public.
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My dissertation draws lessons from these other fields and focuses on an individual
and behavioral perspective with public managers and public organizations as the units of
analysis. I examine other-oriented constructs, such as prosociality and mission orientation
as antecedents. I also examine interactive effects of these variables with organizational
variables (such as task demands) and individual traits (attention to performance data and
experience levels). In my dissertation, I contribute to theory-building in organizational
behavior by focusing on the human side to how organizations and individuals behave and
in particular how they use information in dysfunctional ways. My dissertation lays the
foundation for exploring these other-oriented constructs and how they influence
performance gaming.
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II. ESSAY 1: PERFORMANCE GAMING: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Emerald Publishing Limited owns the copyright for Essay 1 and requests that the
following statement appear on the first page of the reprinted article:
This article is © Emerald Publishing Limited and permission has been granted for this
version to appear here https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-07-2019-0191. Emerald does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere
without the express permission from Emerald Publishing Limited.
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2.1 Introduction

Traditionally, the performance management literature has focused on ways to
improve the performance system in the technical sense. As Radnor (2008a) puts it, “a
systems view … promotes appropriate behavior, provides a mechanism for accountability
and control, and creates a mechanism for intervention and learning” (p.95). But this
performance management doctrine made faulty assumptions that did not account for what
really happens in performance systems (Moynihan, 2008). One of the assumptions was
that performance measurement systems will accurately lead to organizational goals and
effective organizations. This assumption does not account for natural system
consequences that undermine underlying organizational goals. Over the years, the
performance management literature has given this dysfunctional behavior (performance
gaming) considerable attention, mainly explaining why performance dysfunctions occur
from a system perspective (Courty & Marschke, 2007; Hood, 2006; Smith, 1995; van
Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). This paper picks up at this point and expands on factors that
contribute to dysfunctions of performance systems. While public administration has
focused on system factors that influence performance gaming, this paper suggests that
public administration should take a behavioral approach, focusing on individual-level
variables, such as moral identity and other-oriented constructs. This conclusion comes
from a comparative analysis of other social science fields and the unethical behavior
literature. To summarize in a less technical manner, this paper suggests a path forward for
understanding why public organizations and individuals within those organizations
engage in performance gaming. It uses research from other social science disciplines,

23

which suggests that we can research performance gaming by examining behavioral traits,
such as being prosocial and examining the purpose of who and why organizations serve.
2.2 Methods

The systematic review compares studies in public administration to those of other
social science fields. Journal articles were limited to empirical studies, using Google
Scholar, Web of Science, and ProQuest Central. The systematic review covers years
ranging from 1990 through 2019. This span of years was chosen because it coincides
with the rise of New Public Management and the era of research into performance
systems. During the 1990s, the United States federal government implemented the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and many would argue that this
ushered in the era of governance by performance management (Moynihan, 2008). In this
review, a total of 81 articles were found and 51 empirical studies were deemed relevant
(based on criteria explained in the next section). These articles were from academic
journals in both the public administration field, as well other social science disciplines.
There were 26 articles that focused on individual factors (one from the public
administration literature, 6 from economics, 8 from business, and 11 from psychology).
In addition, 14 articles focused on organizational factors (3 of these were from the public
administration literature, 3 from economics, 5 from business, 2 from psychology, and one
from education). For system factors, there were a total of 20 articles (6 of these were
public administration papers, 6 from economics, 3 from business, 4 from psychology, and
one from education). These categories were not exclusive as some articles focused on
drivers from more than one category. The number of articles from the public
24

administration and the other social science disciplines are listed when each category of
drivers is discussed below.
2.2.1 Systematic literature review
An article was deemed relevant if it was 1) an empirical study and 2) performance
gaming or cheating behavior was the outcome variable. Out of the 81 articles surmised
from the search, 51 were deemed relevant by meeting these criteria. To obtain the
articles, the systematic review featured two major avenues. The first avenue was a
database keyword search, using the aforementioned databases. Key words, such as
“performance gaming”, “dysfunctional consequences” and “performance information”
were used. Also, terms such as “dishonesty”, “unethical behavior”, and “cheating” were
also used. The second avenue of the search process was to employ a snowball technique,
used by Belle & Cantarelli (2017a) in their meta-analytic review. In the snowball
technique, a researcher looks at foundational studies in the literature and then searches for
references and articles that have cited the papers, being sure that each reference is
theoretically linked to the foundational article. In this study, foundational studies in the
performance gaming literature for public administration were examined (Bohte & Meier,
2000; Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006) and unethical and performance gaming research that are
foundational in other disciplines were examined (Barkan et al., 2012; Becker, 1968; Hill
& Kochendorfer, 1969). If the articles were linked to performance gaming and based on
the relevancy criteria, they were included. If they did not meet these criteria, they were
excluded.
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Most of the drivers fell under three major categories: performance systems
factors, individual factors, and organizational factors. The papers were then divided
among these factors. To code articles, each antecedent factor was defined. For the system
category, articles would need to have antecedents associated with the performance system
itself, such as the type of system or the maturity level of the performance system. For
articles to be included in the organizational category, organizational variables, such as
resources or political control would need to be labeled as antecedents. And finally, for the
individual factor categories, articles were included if the antecedents were behavioral
actions or psychological traits of the individual. Because some articles studied more than
one factor, some articles appear in more than one category. Articles that appeared in the
public administration journals were coded under the public administration category and
articles from journals outside public administration were coded as “NO” for not being
from the discipline. The PRISMA flow diagram below (Figure 2) illustrates how articles
were systematically included in the review. PRISMA flow diagrams are used by scholars
to improve reporting of systematic reviews (Liberati et al., 2009). In the PRISMA
diagram, 8 articles overlap into more than one category. So, although the total number of
relevant articles is 51, the sum of the total articles from the categories is 59. Table 1
shows all the articles that were included in the systematic literature review, including the
factors that lead to performance gaming, the factor category, and whether the article is
from public administration. Table 2 includes all the excluded articles, including the
reasons for exclusion.
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Figure 2 PRISMA Flow Diagram
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Articles identified
through database
searching (n= 68)

Articles identified
through other sources (n=
23)

Articles removed due to
being duplicates (n= 10)

Articles removed for not
being empirical or not on
performance gaming
(n=30)

Articles screened (n=
81)

Full-text articles assessed for
eligibility (n=51)
(8 articles were in more than
one category)

Articles included in
organizational category
(n=14)

Articles included in
systems category (n=20)

Articles included in
individual category (n=
25)
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Table 1. Factors of performance gaming and unethical behavior

Authors

Abeler et al.,
2014

Title of article

Representative
Evidence on Lying
Costs.

Andrade and Ho, Gaming Emotions in
2009
Social Interactions.

Aquino et al.,
2009
Ashforth and
Anand, 2003
Barkan et al.,
2012

Testing a SocialCognitive Model of
Moral Behavior: The
Interactive Influence
of Situations and
Moral Identity
Centrality
The Normalization of
Corruption in
Organizations
The Pot Calling the
Kettle Black:
Distancing Response
to Ethical Dissonance

Journal

Journal of
Public
Economics
Journal of
Consumer
Research

Factors that lead to
gaming

Factor Category:
System,
Organization, or
Individual

Public
Administratio
n

Self-image, SelfEngagement, or SelfConsciousness or
Moral Identity,

Individual

NO

Individual

NO

Individual

NO

Individual,
Organization

NO

Individual

NO

Self-Interest,
incentives
Self-image, SelfEngagement, or SelfConsciousness or
Moral Identity,
Situational Factor x
Moral Identity

Journal of
Personality
and Social
Psychology
Research in
Self-Justification,
Organizational Organizational
Behavior
Culture
Self-image, SelfJournal of
Engagement, or SelfExperimental Consciousness or
Psychology
Moral Identity
29

Belot and
Schroder, 2013

Sloppy work, lies and
theft: A novel
experimental design to
study
counterproductive
behavior

What’s Measured is
What Matters: Targets
and Gaming in the
English Public Health
Bevan and
Care System
Hood, 2006
Ethics Instruction and
the Perceived
Bloodgood et al., Acceptability of
2010
Cheating.
Goal Displacement:
Assessing the
Motivation for
Bohte and
Organizational
Meier, 2000
Cheating.
Estimating the
Incidence of
Wrongdoing and
Whistle Blowing:
Results of a Study
Burton and
Using Randomized
Near, 1995
Response Technique.
Cadsby et al.
2010

In-Group Favoritism
and Moral DecisionMaking

Journal of
Economic
Behavior and
Organization

Public
Administratio
n

Incentives,
competition

System

NO

System

PA

Individual

NO

Task Demands,
Resources

Organization

PA

Visibility/Monitoring

Individual

NO

Incentives,
Organizational
Culture

Organization

NO

Targets
Self-Interest

Journal of
Business
Ethics
Public
Administratio
n Review

Journal of
Business
Ethics
Journal of
Economic
Behavior &
Organization

30

Carhart et al.,
2002
Cojoc and
Stoian, 2014
Courty and
Marschke, 2007
Erat and
Gneezy, 2012
Fischbacher and
Follmi-Heusi,
2013

Gino et al., 2009

Gino et al., 2013

Glac et al., 2012
Grimes and
Rezek, 2005

Leaning for the Tape:
Evidence of Gaming
Behavior in Equity
Mutual Funds
Dishonesty and
charitable behavior
Making Government
Accountable: Lessons
from a Federal Job
Training Program
White Lies
Lies in Disguise-An
Experimental Study
on Cheating.
Contagion and
Differentiation in
Unethical Behavior:
The Effect of One Bad
Apple on the Barrel
Self-Serving
Altruism? The Lure of
Unethical Actions that
Benefit Others
Conflict in Roles:
Lying to the In-Group
Versus the Out-Group
in Negotiations
The Determinants of
Cheating by High
School Economics

The Journal of
Finance
Experimental
Economics
Public
Administratio
n Review
Management
Science
Journal of the
European
Economic
Association

Psychological
Science
Journal of
Economic
Behavior &
Organization
Business &
Society
International
Review of

Incentives
Temporal
Discounting

System

NO

Individual

NO

System

PA

Individual

NO

Self-image, SelfEngagement, or SelfConsciousness or
Moral Identity

Individual

NO

Organizational
Culture

Organization

NO

Incentives, selfinterest, Prosocial
motives/altruism,

System, Individual

NO

Organization

NO

Individual,
Organization

NO

Incentives, Feedback
loop
Prosocial
motives/altruism

Visibility/Monitoring
Self-Justification,
Organizational
Culture
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Grolleau et al,
2016
Hilbig and
Hessler, 2013

Hood, 2006
Hurkens and
Kartik, 2009

Juenke, 2005
Kaufmann et al.,
2005

Students: A
Comparative Study of
Academic Dishonesty
in the Transitional
Economies
Cheating and Loss
Aversion: Do People
Cheat More to Avoid
a Loss?
What Lies Beneath:
How the Distance
Between Truth and
Lie Drives Dishonesty
Gaming in
Targetworld: The
Targets Approach to
Managing British
Public Services.
Would I lie to you?
On social preferences
and lying aversion.
Management Tenure
and Network Time:
How Experience
Affects Bureaucratic
Dynamics
Ethical Distancing:
Rationalizing
Violations of
Organizational Norms

Economics
Education

Management
Science
Journal of
Experimental
Social
Psychology
Public
Administratio
n Review

Lie-specific
mechanisms

Individual

NO

Lie-specific
mechanisms

Individual

NO

Targets, Incentives

System

PA

Experimental
Economics
Journal of
Public
Administratio
n Research
and Theory

Incentives

System

NO

experience

Individual

PA

Business &
Professional
Ethics Journal

Self-Justification

Individual

NO
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Kelman and
Friedman, 2009

Performance
Improvement and
Performance
Dysfunction: An
Empirical
Examination of
Distortionary Impacts
of the Emergency
Room Wait-Time
Target in the English
National Health
Service

Journal of
Public
Administratio
n Research
and Theory

Larkin, 2014;

The Cost of HighPowered Incentives:
Employee Gaming in
Enterprise Software
Sales

Journal of
Labor
Economics

Mazar et al.,
2008
McCabe and
Trevino, 1993
Mead et al.,
2009

The Dishonesty of
Honest People: A
Theory Of SelfConcept Maintenance
Academic Dishonesty:
Honor Codes and
Other Contextual
Influences
Too Tired to Tell The
Truth: Self-control
Resource Depletion
And Dishonesty

target, system,
feedback loop,

Journal of
Marketing
Research
Journal of
Higher
Education
Journal of
Experimental
Social
Psychology

System

PA

Incentives
Incentives,
Organizational
Culture, Self-image,
Self-Engagement, or
Self-Consciousness
or Moral Identity

System

NO

System,
Organization,
Individual

NO

Organizational
Culture, incentives

Organization,
System

NO

Cognitive depletion

Individual

NO
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Mitchell et al.,
2018

Nagin et al.,
2002
Ottaviani and
Squintani, 2006

Radnor, 2008b
Rigdon and
D’Esterre, 2015

Schindler and
Pfattheicher,
2017

Cheating under
pressure: A selfprotection model of
workplace cheating
behavior.
Monitoring,
Motivation, and
Management: The
Determinants of
Opportunistic
Behavior in a Field
Experiment.
Naive Audience and
Communication Bias
Muddled, Massaging,
Manoeuvring Or
Manipulated? A
Typology of
Organizational
Gaming
The Effects of
Competition on the
Nature of Cheating
Behavior

The Frame of the
Game: Loss-Framing
Increases Dishonest
Behavior.

Journal of
Applied
Psychology

Targets, anger, SelfInterest

System, Individual

NO

Visibility/Monitoring

Organization

NO

The American
Economic
Review
International
Journal of
Game Theory
International
Journal of
Productivity
and
Performance
Management

Targets

System

NO

Targets, task
demands

System,
Organization

PA

Southern
Economic
Journal

Competition

System

NO

Journal of
Experimental
Social
Psychology

Lie-specific
mechanisms

Individual

NO
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Schocket &
Burghardt, 2008

Schweitzer and
Hsee, 2002
Schwieren and
Weichselbaumer
, 2010

Shalvi, 2012

Shalvi et al.,
2011

Tenbrunsel,
1998
Utikal and
Fischbacher,
2013

Do Job Corps
Performance
Measures Track
Program Impacts?
Stretching the Truth:
Elastic Justification
and Motivated
Communication of
Uncertain Information
Does Competition
Enhance Performance
or Cheating? A
Laboratory
Experiment.

Journal of
Policy
Analysis and
Management

Targets,

System

PA

Journal of
Risk and
Uncertainty

Self-Justification,
competition

Individual

NO

Journal of
Economic
Psychology

Competition

System

NO

Dishonestly increasing
the likelihood of
winning
Justified ethicality:
Observing desired
counterfactuals
modifies ethical
perceptions and
behavior
Misrepresentation and
Expectation of
Misrepresentation in
an Ethical Dilemma:
The Role of Incentives
and Temptation
Disadvantageous Lies
in Individual
Decisions

Judgment and
Decision
Making

Individual

NO

Individual

NO

Situational Factor x
Moral Identity

Organizational
Behavior and
Human
Decision
Processes
Self-Justification

Academy of
Management
Journal
Journal of
Economic

Incentives,
System,
organizational culture Organization
Self-image, SelfEngagement, or SelfIndividual
35

NO

NO

Behavior &
Organization
Why do people keep
their promise? An
experimental test of
two explanations
Vanberg, 2008

Vincent et al.,
2013

Welsh and
Ordonez, 2014

Wiltermuth,
2011

Yang, 2009
Zhang et al.,
2008

Consciousness or
Moral Identity
Self-image, SelfEngagement, or SelfConsciousness or
Moral Identity

Econometrica
Stretching the Moral
Gray Zone: Positive
Affect, Moral
Disengagement, and
Dishonesty
Conscience without
Cognition: The
Effects of
Subconscious Priming
on Ethical Behavior.

Cheating More When
the Spoils Are Split.
Examining Perceived
Honest Performance
Reporting by Public
Organizations:
Bureaucratic Politics
and Organizational
Practice
Earnings
Manipulation and

Psychological
Science
Academy of
Management
Journal
Organizational
Behavior
and Human
Decision
Processes
Journal of
Public
Administratio
n Research
and Theory
The Academy
of

Individual

NO

Temporal
Discounting, moral
image

Individual

NO

Visibility/Monitoring
, moral image

Organization

NO

Incentives, Prosocial
motives/altruism

System

NO

organizational culture Organization

PA

Incentives

NO
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System

Zhong et al.,
2010

Stock-Based Incentive
Misalignment.
Good Lamps Are the
Best Police: Darkness
Increases Dishonesty
and Self-interested
Behavior

Management
Journal

Psychological
Science

Visibility/Monitoring

Organization

NO

Table 2. Excluded Articles
Reason for
exclusion

Authors

Title of article

Journal

Alge et al.,
2006
Ayal et al.,
2015

An Identity-Based Model of
Organizational Monitoring:
Integrating Information Privacy and
Organizational Justice
Three Principles to Revise People’s
Unethical Behavior

Research in Personnel
and Human Resources
Management
Perspectives on
Psychological Science

theory paper

Benabou
and Tirole,
2011

Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs
as assets

Quarterly Journal of
Economics

theory paper

Bevan and
Hamblin,
2008

Hitting and missing targets by ambulance services for emergency
calls: effects of different systems of performance measurement
within the UK

not an empirical
paper

Burgess and
Ratto, 2003

The Role of Incentives in the Public
Sector: Issues and Evidence

theory paper

Oxford Review of
Economic Policy
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theory paper

Public
Administration

NO
NO

NO

PA

Cuganesan
et al., 2014

In search of virtue: The role of
virtues, values and character
strengths in ethical decision making
The Riskiness of Public Sector
Performance Measurement: A
Review and Research Agenda

Frey et al.,
2013

Organizational Control Systems and
Pay-for-Performance in the Public
Service

Crossan et
al., 2013

Gibbs et al.,
2009

Journal of Business
Ethics
Financial Accountability
and Management

Organization Studies
Industrial Relations: A
Journal of Economy and
Society

Hannah et
al., 2011

Performance Measure Properties and
Incentive System Design
Moral maturation and moral
conation: A capacity approach to
explaining moral thought and action

Hood, 2012

Public management by numbers as a
performance‐enhancing drug: two
Hypotheses

Public Administration
Review

Hood and
Dixon, 2010

The Political Payoff from
Performance Target Systems: NoBrainer or No-Gainer?

Journal of Public
Administration Research
and Theory

Hruschka et
al., 2014

Impartial institutions, pathogen
stress and the expanding social
network

Human Nature

Academy of Management
Review

38

theory paper
theory paper
dv is negative
outcomes and not
necessarily
gaming in
particular
dv is incentive
systems and not
necessarily
gaming in
particular
theory paper
not an obs or
experim paper,
but topic is
gaming
dv is negative
outcomes and not
necessarily
gaming in
particular
redundant paper studies cheating
on behalf of ingroup members

NO
PA

PA

NO
NO

PA

PA

NO

(Cadsby et al,
2015)

Hyman,
2001

Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
Market Change, Social Norms, and
the
Trust “Reposed in the Workmen”.

The Journal of Legal
Studies

theory paper

Jacobsen et
al., 2018

Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide
to the Dishonesty Literature

Journal of Economic
Surveys

overview of the
literature

Jakobsen et
al., 2017

Making sense of performance
regimes: Rebalancing external
accountability and internal learning.

Perspectives on Public
Management and
Governance
Journal of Public
Administration Research
and Theory,

Jones, 1991

Which Clients are Deserving of
Help? A Theoretical Model and
Experimental Test
Ethical Decision Making by
Individuals in Organizations: An
Issue Contingent Model.

Jones and
Euske, 1991

Strategic Misrepresentation in
Budgeting

The Academy of
Management Review
Journal of Public
Administration Research
and Theory

Mass and
Van
Rinsum,
2013

How control system design
influences performance misreporting

Journal of Accounting
Research

Jilke and
Tummers,
2018
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theory paper
deservingness of
clients is related
to gaming
behavior, also
mainly theory

theory paper

theory paper
redundant paper studies cheating
related to peers
(Cadsby et al,
2015; Thau et al.,
2015)

NO
NO

PA

PA

NO

PA

NO

Meier and
Krause,
2003
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2.2.2 PA Research: Systems and Organizations
There is a total of 7 articles that deal with system and organizational factors in the
public administration literature. Performance gaming is conceptualized as behavior that
results in performance data that is desirable but does not meet the intent of the objective
or indicator. The conceptualization of performance gaming rests on the idea that it
undermines organizational goals usually through some sort of manipulation (Hood, 2006;
Moynihan, 2010). Hood (2007, p.100) describes “gaming or cheating as the deliberate
massaging or outright fabrication of numbers collected with the intention of improving
the position of an individual or organization”. With respect to that definition, Hood
describes a gaming typology, with different types of gaming that accounts for the
unintended nature of gaming.
Performance systems themselves offer the opportunity for performance gaming
behavior because they are often accompanied by features, such as targets, benchmarks,
and incentives (Bevan & Hood, 2006). In public organizations, performance
measurement and reporting is a means of control. There is a desire for public
administrators to be accountable through constant reporting of performance and
monitoring of this performance. The assumption, as Smith (1995) states, is that
performance systems will yield benefits for the public in efficiency and equity, but this
assumption is based on “inadequate modes of production and control” (p. 277), and so a
performance system utterly fails if the system itself does not account for its own
deficiencies. Performance system target and incentives (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Radnor,
2008b), ensuing competition (Hood, 2006), and performance system design and
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measurement flaws (Courty and Marschke, 2007; de Brujin, 2002) are the primary drivers
of performance gaming in the public administration literature.
Organizational culture is important to behavior in a firm (O’Reilly & Chatman,
1996), and so it has been a studied factor for its influence on performance information
use (Jennings & Haist, 2004; Moynihan & Landuyt, 2009; Moynihan & Pandey 2010).
Taylor (2014) discusses organizational culture as manifesting at different organizational
levels to influence performance information use. Hood (2012) theorizes that
organizational culture can affect performance system types and thus affect performance
systems in perverse ways. Moynihan (2009) explains that performance data use can
become embedded in an organization’s day-to-day routine and become part of the
organization’s culture overtime. So, in the public administration literature, organizational
culture is an important factor in studying performance use (Andersen and Moynihan,
2016; Cepiku et al., 2017; Destler, 2016). But for performance gaming in particular,
researchers are beginning to examine culture because it “has a salient influence on
performance information use” (Taylor, 2014, p.9).
2.2.3 Behavioral Insights from Other Disciplines
Other social science disciplines have primarily examined individual and intrinsic
factors that lead to performance gaming (Abeler et al., 2014; Ayal et al., 2015; Barkan et
al., 2012; Utikal & Fischbacher, 2013). This section focuses on empirical studies from
the fields of psychology, business administration, education, and economics, where the
primary drivers are self-image, moral identity, self-justification, and other cognitive
functions. There are a total of 23 articles that deal with individual factors in the other
disciplines examined for this category.
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In the literature outside of public administration, manipulation of performance
data is studied in the context of various types of unethical behavior, which can
encompass more than performance gaming. Unethical behavior describes organizational
malfeasance such as “cheating on taxes, insurance fraud, employee theft, academic
dishonesty, athletes’ use of illegal drugs, and of course illegal downloading of software
and digital content” (Gino et al., 2009, p.393). The way individuals perceive the degree
of dishonesty, “the saliency of unethicality,” can dictate whether one engages in the
dishonest behavior (Gino et al., 2009, p.393). This is to say that dishonest behavior, if not
viewed as dishonest by the participant, can increase the likelihood of it occurring
(Baumeister, 1998; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). This fact is important for a conceptual
understanding of ethical behavior and performance gaming behavior because it makes a
parallel that ethicality and gaming can be done unwittingly. Menzel (2005) describes a
connection between organizational performance and ethics, describing performance
gaming as a type of unethical behavior.
Moral reminders, cues that serve as signals to behave ethically, activate moral
identity, a type of identity defined as “the cognitive schema a person holds about his or
her moral character” (Aquino et al., 2009, p.124). A study on individuals’ dishonesty
revealed that when individuals were given the Ten Commandments before a performance
task, individuals acted much more ethical than those not given the commandments
(Mazar et al., 2008). The Ten Commandments served as an ethical cue, which activated
individuals’ moral identity, prompting moral behavior. People also like to think of
themselves as morally honest and “maintaining a favorable self-image is one of the
relevant motives” for honest behavior (Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi, 2013).
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Moral identity or moral self-image must be activated in order for it to affect moral
behavior (Welsh & Ordonez, 2014). This is not to say that other factors are not at play,
but there is an important role that moral identity plays in moral behavior. Self-concept or
moral identity has to be activated or engaged through an activity or a situation (Aquino et
al., 2009). People can be primed through a situation or a cue that reminds them of their
identity and then this affects their propensity to behave morally (Ayal et al., 2015).
2.3 Analysis of empirical studies

The previous sections discussed performance gaming under three main categories
of drivers: system, organizations, and individual drivers. In this section, there will be an
in-depth discussion with respect to what has been empirically studied, organized along
the three categories of drivers.
2.3.1 System Factors
The system factors that have been studied include types of performance systems
and their incentives, pressures and competition effects. And also the design of
performance systems, where system design can lead to performance gaming. Courty &
Marschke (2007) studied performance gaming in the context of government job training
centers. The training centers had a performance measure based on trainee employment
status and trainee wages after completion of a job training program. The measurement
design was the key factor for gaming behavior because training centers had wide
discretion in how they reported successful job training completion and wages. For
example, training centers could wait to terminate trainees from the program even if the
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trainees were not actively being trained. So, in this study, gaming behavior was
operationalized as the accurate reporting of training completion. The practical
implications for public management is that designers must regularly detect weaknesses
and make adjustments. The public sector has unique aspects for these implications
because the authors note that decision-makers at the local level can gain superior
understanding of ways to manipulate performance measures, exasperated by the
multidimensional and varied nature of objectives in public sector performance measures.
Courty & Marschke (2003) developed a theoretical model to show how managers can
respond to gaming behavior learned overtime and they apply to this to a case study. Their
model is based on system viability theory, which explains that systems are living and
evolve and adapt to their environments. Applying this to performance systems involves
managers creating monitoring systems, review mechanisms, and then deploying
objectives to individual units within the organization, based on information gathered from
the monitor and review. When it comes to system factors, the design of a performance
system is important to consider as a means of reducing performance gaming.
2.3.2 Organizational Characteristics
Bohte and Meier (2000) is an exemplar study from the organizational thread of
performance gaming factors. The context of this study is the school environment, often
an ideal setting for studying performance because schools are engaged in more extensive
collection and use of data compared to other public sectors. From Bohte & Meier (2000),
the factors that contribute to gaming are task demands and resources, which can be
externally and internally exerted on an organization. The study focuses on 476 public
school districts in Texas. Cheating or gaming behavior is operationalized as the
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percentage of students exempted from taking the state standardized test, accounting for
legitimate exemptions.
The idea is that schools will want to exclude academically low students from
taking the test in order to boost overall standardized test scores. The study uses a
theoretical explanation based on goal theory, describing cheating behavior as the act of
displacing goals. In goal theory, goals are set as ways to motivate individuals but can
become problematic when one goal seems to conflict with another, leading to
displacement or substitution of a goal. The practical implications for public management
given in the study rest on system design, but also organizational norms are important to
mitigate performance gaming.
Organizations must make conscious efforts to reinforce procedures and structures
that emphasize goals and appropriate behavior. The practical implications are that there
are remedies to reducing cheating via norms and standard, but the specific ways to
incorporate these norms into everyday scenarios remains an open question. For
organizational factors, individuals are influenced by performance gaming depending on
the organization’s culture toward morality (Cadsby et al., 2016; Gino et al., 2009) and
how that culture manifests itself at different levels (Taylor, 2014).
2.3.3 Individual characteristic
The main driver in the individual category is that of moral identity. “People care
about who they are and infer their own values from past choices” (Benabou & Tirole,
2011, p.805). The self-image theme spans across all studies of the individual thread of
performance gaming and unethical behavior. It appears to contradict the idea that human
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beings are solely economic rationalizers, heavily selfish and void of any moral compass.
The individual category of factors focuses on the individual and the cognitive
mechanisms that precede decision-making. Two exemplar studies for this thread are that
of Schindler & Pfattheicher (2017), who study loss aversion, and also Gino et al. (2013),
who study altruistic cheating behavior. In Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017), the
researchers conduct two experiments, both consisting of a general population sample,
where participants had to roll a die and flip a coin. Cheating behavior is measured by the
individuals reporting the number of the die roll or face of the coin flip compared to its
probability. In Gino et al. (2013), the authors studied cheating behavior and found that it
increases when others can benefit from the cheating. The study consisted of three
experiments, each involving college students and tasks that included opportunities to
cheat where cheating would knowingly benefit another group other than the cheaters. The
researchers found that altruism contributes to positive self-image and allows individuals
to justify their dishonest behavior. The practical implications for this study is that
beneficiaries are useful for motivating behavior, even when it is dishonest and so
individuals must understand how beneficiaries function for a given task or scenario. So,
for the category of individual characteristics, moral identity and its influence on moral
behavior is the one of the most significant drivers studied (Abeler et al., 2014; Gino et al.,
2013)
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2.4 Hypotheses

2.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Perceived prosocial impact reduces performance gaming.
Other-oriented constructs, as such as prosociality and public service motivation,
offer alternative explanations for how managers make decisions (Belle, 2013b). Because
perceived prosocial impact is a nascent area of study (Bolino & Grant, 2016), it is worth
examining this particular other-oriented construct. Perceived prosocial impact is defined
as the perception that an individual’s action at work benefits others (Sonnentag & Grant,
2012). Though it is a burgeoning area of study, research has revealed it has many
benefits. Among individual employees, it increases persistence, productivity, and reduces
employee errors (Belle, 2013b). It is related to feeling inspired, relaxed, excited, and calm
(known collectively as positive affect) (Sonnentag & Grant, 2012). Perceived prosocial
impact is further increased when employees are under the direction of transformational
leaders (Grant, 2012). Will perceived prosocial impact have these same benefits for
performance systems as far as performance gaming is concerned. The hypothesis would
be: Perceived prosocial impact is likely to reduce performance gaming. The important
element of perceived impact is that individuals must feel their work is beneficial to
others. It matters not that the work is actually beneficial, only that the individuals
perceive it to be. To measure perceived prosocial impact, a 3-item scale can be used
(Grant, 2008b). There are studies that have used perceived prosocial impact as an
antecedent to study other behavior (Grant & Campbell 2007; Sonnentag & Grant 2012).
These can be examples to follow for public administration’s study of performance
gaming and perceived impact. In Sonnentag and Grant (2012) participants’ perceived
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impact is measured at work and participants write in diaries, which are used to gather
understanding of how perceived impact influences positive feelings at home.
2.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Public managers who activate moral identity engage in less
performance gaming compared to managers who do not.
In the psychology field, there have been studies showing that individuals will lie
in order to maintain a favorable image of themselves (Abeler et al., 2014; Fischbacher &
Follmi-Heusi, 2013). When individuals are reminded about their identity, they take on
this identity and this affects their level of honesty (Abeler et al., 2014). Cohn et al. (2013)
conducted a study on prisoners who were primed about their criminal past and thus had
reduced levels of honesty compared to prisoners who were not primed. An important
point to make is that individuals think of their moral self in abstract terms and are not
likely to engage in moral behavior based solely on their self-concept without a trigger
(Ayal et al., 2014). Situational factors trigger the ability of individuals to access their
moral identity and thus behave morally (Aquino et al., 2009). The trigger or activation of
the moral self is important for self-concept or image to play a significant role in honest
behavior. Studies of moral identity as an antecedent of honesty have examined active
engagement as necessary in the causal model (Shu et al., 2012). Active engagement can
consist of signing one’s name on a document before making a report or participating in a
morally-laden assignment. So, the hypothesis is extended to state that moral identity must
also be activated. The hypothesis would be: public managers who activate moral identity
engage in less performance gaming compared to managers who do not activate their
moral identity. Moral identity can be measured using a scale by Aquino and Reed (2002)
which asks participants to measure their moral self-using a 7-point Likert-type after a list
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of moral characteristics and visualizing a person with these traits. Examples of studies
can be found in Hertz and Krettenauer's (2016) meta-analysis examining moral identity
and moral behavior.
2.4.3 Hypotheses 3 & 4: 3) Perceived prosocial impact and gaming
Verbeke, Volgering, and Hessels (1998, p.313) describe organizational culture as
“a system of shared norms and behaviors that are learned by the members of the
organization and shape their way of doing”. Because organizational culture shapes
behavior, it is always an important internal organizational variable to consider when
studying the behavior of individuals within a firm. Scholars have studied how culture
improves organizational effectiveness (Schraeder et al., 2005) and the importance of
cultural settings being coupled with management practices (Baird & Harrison, 2017;
Smith, 1998). Hood (2012) discussed the importance of organizational culture as a
category of factor that enhances or obstructs performance. Hood hypothesized that
specific types of measurement systems would enhance or obstruct performance, but
whether they would obstruct or enhance performance, would depend on the mediating
variable of organizational culture. The cultures described were hierarchist, egalitarian
and individualist culture. Situational factors trigger the ability of individuals to access
their moral identity and thus behave morally (Aquino et al., 2009). Two hypotheses are:
the effect of perceived prosocial impact will depend on the organizational culture and
also the effect of self-image will depend on culture. Organizational culture can be
measured using the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) (Baird & Harrison, 2017;
O'Reilly III et al., 1991; Windsor & Ashkanasy, 1996). The OCP uses five components of
culture: Innovation, Teamwork, Outcome Orientation, Respect for People and Attention
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to Detail. And it asks respondents to measure the value of each component on a 5-point
Likert scale. Andersen & Moynihan (2016) is an example of study that uses
organizational culture as an antecedent for performance use in an experimental context.
The researchers use a randomized controlled field experiment to study whether public
managers are responsive to diversity when they perceive an innovative organizational
culture
2.4.4 Experimental research
The public administration field has not benefited, however, from the rich research
that can be found in experimental studies, which dominate the literature in other
disciplines (Faravelli et al., 2015; Gino et al., 2013; Zhong et al., 2010). Real-life
performance schemes can be simulated, where public managers or other individuals are
involved in actual performance tasks. The simulated performance task can also include a
task where there is opportunity to manipulate performance reports. Faravelli et al. (2015)
conducted such an experiment where participants engaged in a performance task and then
reported performance that was incentivized. Another innovative approach is an online
virtual performance system (Douglas et al., 2019), which is not exactly experimental, but
can be altered to run experiments. Douglas et al. (2019) created a virtual public
organization where public managers access a role-play tool and report to multiple
stakeholders as they apply different performance tools. The researchers study
performance management, including gaming behavior from data collected through the
tool.
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2.5 Conclusion

This review reveals three major categories of drivers that are associated with
performance gaming: performance systems factors, individual factors, and organizational
factors. This paper makes several hypotheses based on the comparison between public
administration and other disciplines. We lack a strong theory for performance gaming.
Although public administration scholars have created frameworks and typologies (Courty
& Marschke, 2003; Smith, 1995), these frameworks are not strong in their predictive
power and are limited in a profound explanation of the phenomenon. They provide
implications for management practice, but still lack a clear direction for what variables
we should pay attention to and under what conditions. In summary, this paper advocates
for research that will lead to theory-building through a study of behavioral factors. This
will come from studying many of the individual factors described in this paper (moral
identity and perceived prosocial impact). The use of more individual factors and
increased experimental designs are the major lessons drawn from the other social science
disciplines.
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III. ESSAY 2: EXPLAINING EFFORT SUBSTITUTION IN PERFORMANCE
SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF TASK DEMANDS AND MISSION ORIENTATION

3.1 Abstract

This paper contributes to a theory of performance gaming, as it studies why public
organizations engage in effort substitution (i.e., directing effort towards rewarded as
opposed to unrewarded areas). We argue that effort substitution becomes more likely if
tasks are difficult; less likely in the presence of a strong mission orientation; and that
mission orientation can mitigate the task demands effect. Examining a five-year panel
data set of high schools, we find support for the hypotheses when rewarded and
unrewarded measures capture different dimensions of performance. However, results are
mixed when rewarded and unrewarded measures are conceptually linked. In more simple
terms, this paper suggests that mission-focused organizations are likely to engage in less
performance gaming. There is an association between an organization that is aligned to
its purpose and mitigating the effects that are linked to performance gaming, such as
challenging tasks and limited resources.
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3.2 Introduction

Many public organizations are engaging in performance management practices.
Performance systems show promise to help organizations improve their efficiency and
effectiveness by establishing routines of systematic measurement, reporting, and analysis
(Moynihan & Beazley 2016; Van de Walle, 2009; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan
2015). At the same time, the link between measurement and improvement is not as
explicit as often expected. Organizational factors (Kroll, 2015; Moynihan & Pandey,
2010) and individual biases (Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017; Olsen, 2015) constrain the use
of performance information for decision-making, and purposeful use may not necessarily
create immediate improvements in organizational and societal outcomes (Gerrish, 2016;
Kroll, 2017).
Meanwhile, evidence is accumulating that dysfunctions of performance systems
can harm clients and citizens. Specifically, data gaming – which we conceptualize as
generating positive performance data without achieving the actual objective behind the
indicator – can be detrimental. Examples of performance gaming include the
downgrading of crime to mask bad statistics, “cream skimming” of easy-to-place clients
in job training programs, or a tendency to teach-to-the-test in the school system (Eterno
& Silverman, 2012; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Radin, 2006). Although we do not
believe that gaming and cheating behaviors will dominate every performance system (and
our thinking is informed by Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Kerpershoek et al., 2016 as well
as Wenger et al., 2008), we note that such observations have occurred too frequently
across several contexts to be dismissed as exceptions or outliers, and we suggest that
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most systems are likely to experience some level of gaming (e.g., Bohte & Meier, 2000;
Hood 2006; Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Soss, Fording, & Schram 2011).
Despite the overwhelming evidence suggesting that gaming is a real threat to most
performance systems, we lack organizational theory explaining why gaming is more
likely to occur in some cases than in others. In fact, most theories focus on the system
itself as the explanatory variable arguing, for example, that static regimes with highpowered incentives and a great deal of social pressure are very likely to experience
performance gaming (Eterno & Silverman, 2012; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). While we
agree that system configuration shapes behavior, we also think there is more to learn
about the differences in the behavior of organizations that are all subjected to the same
performance system. That is, once we hold the incentive structure constant, how can we
explain why some organizations are more likely to engage in gaming behavior than
others?
This paper contributes to such a theory of performance gaming. Specifically, we
study one type of gaming known as effort substitution, where organizations tend to focus
on rewarded areas at the expense of unrewarded ones. We argue that effort substitution is
a function of task demands, mission orientation, and the interactions of these two factors.
In cases in which tasks are more difficult, organizations have a hard time meeting
performance targets and, hence, may shift attention and resources from unrewarded to
rewarded areas. At the same time, a strong mission orientation may prevent organizations
from trading off multiple purposes to the point, where mission orientation mitigates the
effect of task demands on effort substitution.
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We examine these hypotheses in the context of schools in the United States, and
we do so for two reasons. First, the school system shares important characteristics with
public organizations and agencies more broadly and, hence, constitutes a fairly
representative case (O’Toole & Meier, 2006; 2011). Second, schools in the US are a
particularly promising case to study performance management systems because schools
(specifically the K-12 sector) have been exposed to more than a decade of standardized
testing and accountability mechanisms, and this policy area has also seen its fair share of
performance gaming (Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Lewis & Triantafillou, 2012).
In particular, we employ a five-year panel data set of 64 high schools in one
school district, thereby holding constant the performance regime under which all the
schools operate. We capture effort substitution by creating variables that put schools’
performance on rewarded measures in relation to their performance on unrewarded ones.
One effort substitution variable is based on rewarded and unrewarded measures that are
conceptually linked, while the other is based on measures that are minimally connected.
We find support for the proposed effects of task demands, mission orientation, and their
interaction, however, mostly in cases in which rewarded and unrewarded measures pick
up on different objectives and offer real choices. Our findings are much more mixed if
rewarded and unrewarded measures are conceptually linked.
3.3 Gaming of Performance Systems

In this section, we review and organize the literature on performance gaming, and
we explain how our work on effort substitution fits with previous scholarship. In our
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typology, we differentiate between two types of gaming – the manipulation of data and
effort (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Gaming Typology
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Data manipulation is the fudging of numbers, where performance improves on
paper, but without any actual increases in output. Kelman and Friedman (2009, p. 924)
describe this as simply gaming or the consumption of real resources “with no genuine
performance improvement even on the measured indicator.” Smith (1995) introduces two
terms: misrepresentation, where data is misreported or distorted, and ossification, where a
data indicator is intentionally kept in the performance system though it is no longer
needed or relevant, thus causing performance to be skewed. Bohte and Meier (2000)
describe data manipulation as a form of organizational cheating. All these terms fall
under the umbrella term of data manipulation because each term deals with altering
performance information without producing actual output or improvement. Distortion and
cheating are the two main forms of data manipulation (Hood, 2006). The distortion of
data involves creatively interpreting, reporting, or rearranging data to make it favourable.

59

In contrast, cheating behavior is lying or complete fabrication of data and is the riskiest
form of gaming, as it can carry serious consequences if discovered.
The public administration literature on data manipulation has focused mainly on
the distortion of data. Courty and Marschke (2007) study data distortion and show how
managers manipulated program termination dates of trainees so they could terminate
trainees when their wages and employment status had reached acceptable performance
levels. The study reveals that managers can game the system by learning it. Another
example of creative distortion comes from Bohte and Meier (2000), who examine how
superintendents of school districts in Texas exempted certain students from taking
standardized tests. Performance numbers went up without any actual improvement in
student achievement. Bevan and Hood (2006) find that response times for ambulances
had been “corrected” to the target time without explanation, which is yet another example
of gaming behavior.
The second major form of gaming is effort manipulation, which describes ways in
which managers manipulate effort or resources to game the system. Under effort
manipulation, there exists the sub-categories of effort substitution and effort reduction.
Effort reduction, described by Smith (1995) as sub-optimization, involves reducing effort
without necessarily transferring the effort elsewhere. Effort reduction is also described
using the terms ratchet effect and threshold effect (Bevan & Hood, 2006). The ratchet
effect is behavior, which occurs when managers know that they must meet or exceed last
year’s numbers. In effect, they reduce effort this year so they can more easily reach the
target next year. The threshold effect occurs when a particular threshold must be reached
by everyone in the organization. In essence, low performers will be pressured to reach the
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threshold, while high performers, who usually surpass the threshold, will deteriorate their
performance to drop back to the threshold and, hence, willingly lower their performance.
Effort substitution occurs when more effort is given to a measured indicator at the
expense of an unmeasured indicator – basically effort is substituted for the unmeasured
indicator (Kelman & Friedman, 2009). Other scholars have labelled this phenomenon
goal displacement (Bohte & Meier, 2000) or output distortion (Hood, 2006). An example
of this, in the context of public schools, would be to reduce instruction in social studies
(since it is not assessed on most standardized tests) and to increase instruction in reading
and math (which are assessed on standardized tests). Effort substitution results in actual
improvement on the measured indicator, but it usually comes at the expense of the
unmeasured indicator. Cream skimming may fall under effort substitution if it involves
serving the most favourable clients, while neglecting less favourable clients (Koning &
Heinrich, 2013). Such behavior will involve effort substitution, as resources will be taken
away from the unfavourable clients in order to support efforts for the more favourable
clients.
Effort substitution is different from making purposeful strategic choices. In fact,
prioritization is legitimate and often the result from strategic planning efforts. For
example, in some situations, public organizations may opt to prioritize quality over
efficiency, and in other cases, they may make the reversed choice. However, if an
organization makes the choice to focus on quality (as opposed to efficiency, for
example), we expect it – if considered successful – to do well on multiple measures of
quality, rewarded and unrewarded ones. However, if the organization does much better
on rewarded than unrewarded indicators, we consider this evidence for effort substitution.
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There have been a handful of studies on effort substitution. For example, Bevan
and Hood (2006) studied storming, a form of effort substitution where employees storm a
task by sucking up effort from other departments in order to meet an impending
evaluation date. This was observed in their study of the U.K. Commission of Health
where hospital workers cancelled operations and drafted in other medical staff during the
days leading up to an evaluation. Koning and Heinrich (2013) observe effort substitution
in their study of workers who received disability insurance versus workers who received
unemployment insurance. The disability insured were harder to serve and as result, they
had longer job searches – evidence that effort had been reduced in serving the harder-toplace disability insured workers.
This paper contributes to the literature on effort substitution, which is one of four
types of performance gaming. Our understanding of effort substitution is descriptive, not
normative. If organizations focus on objective A but only do well on the related rewarded
indicators (e.g., A1 and A2) but not the unrewarded ones (e.g., A3 and A4), we consider
this effort substitution. While we observe this behavioral pattern, we make no normative
claims about who is at fault – individuals who make choices, interest groups creating
pressure, or the performance system that generates constraints. We are interested in
documenting behavioral outcomes and understanding related organizational triggers, but
our study does not aim at disentangling multiple individuals’ intentions, actions, and
motivations. While the latter could be certainly of interest to readers, it would also
require conducting a different empirical study. In the following section, we outline a
theory of effort substitution, which we then test in the subsequent sections.
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3.4 Task Demands and Mission Orientation

Our theoretical arguments are based on a set of assumptions about performance
systems. First, in the creation of performance management systems, elected officials are
the ultimate designers of performance systems and these regulators have a clear intention
of the performance they seek to stimulate. The relationship of the regulator (elected
officials) and the agents (bureaucrats) is explained by principal-agent theory which
describes agents as being controlled and monitored by elected officials (the regulators or
principals) via the collection of performance data (Moynihan, 2008). Without a
performance system, the agents are likely to shirk the assigned task and act
opportunistically. Second, while some bureaucrats are driven by self-interest, others may
value prosocial motives and act as stewards of the organizational mission. Organizations
can shape mission orientation through structure and culture, and a mission-based culture
is seen as a key feature of effective government and provides a framework for goalsetting, fostering motivation and results (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999; Wolf, 1993).
Hence, we make the assumption that performance systems contend with varying levels of
mission-orientation. Our third assumption is that performance systems are multifaceted
and thus agents are multitasking to achieve proficiency for various performance
indicators. The performance system must contend with these different areas of
performance for the same organization (Van Dooren et al., 2015). This is a peril of
performance systems because agents may choose to attend to some goals while
neglecting other goals or completely avoiding the objectives (Moynihan, 2008; Smith,
1995).
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Many performance systems are being set up for the purpose of benchmarking and
comparing agencies or units that conduct similar tasks (Gerrish, 2016; Van Dooren et al.,
2015). Examples include schools, police departments, or hospitals (Eterno & Silverman,
2012; Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Kelman & Friedman, 2009). A main feature of such systems
is that they apply the same indicators and targets to assess agencies, rank them, and
reward or sanction based on performance. However, while the task these agencies
perform may be identical, the level of difficulty is likely to vary. Task demands are
shaped by the conditions under which the task is performed (Robinson, 2001, p. 32f.). In
a government setting, the needs of minority and low-income clients often make the
service provision more demanding (O’Toole & Meier, 2006, p. 102). Examples of clients
who may be harder to serve include schools where students come to class with issues that
impede learning, or hospitals where patients have complex healthcare needs.
In cases in which tasks are difficult but performance rewards or sanctions
substantial, agencies will likely be punished for poor performance, despite the fact that
these agencies must cope with bigger constraints. If said agencies do not deem it feasible
to enhance measured performance due to actual output improvements, they might engage
in other practices such as gaming. One particular strategy to deal with performance
pressure is to shift effort, attention, and resources to measured activities and objectives at
the expense of other important – but unmeasured – tasks (Bohte & Meier, 2000; Koning
& Heinrich, 2013). While some systems are able to attenuate the negative task demands
effect through a focus on relative gains, most systems assign at least some importance to
absolute performance levels or minimum targets, and only a few systems create
benchmarking clusters based on similar task demands.
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Agencies confronted with daunting tasks demands may choose to engage in effort
substitution because such practices could be considered somewhat legitimate in the face
of rigid performance pressure, and they do not require any data manipulation. Effort
substitution is also feasible because it exploits the professional discretion that most public
agencies have. Typically, political authorities identify difficult problems and then
bureaucrats are tasked with solving these complex problems, often with limited
resources. A dilemma occurs because bureaucrats are given only vague guidance as to
how they should solve these complex problems (Goodsell, 1994). Due to broad discretion
in policy-making, bureaucracies may opt to “creative” ways to solve problems,
subverting performance system mechanisms in ways that undermine organizational goals
(Soss et al., 2011).
As argued above, effort substitution can have very detrimental effects on agency
clients and outcomes. In fact, dealing with difficult tasks in a government setting often
means working with underserved populations, which may end up doubly disadvantaged if
improvements in one area are traded for null effects in others. Considering the literature
on performance pressure, varying task demands, and effort substitution we summarized
in this section, we hypothesize the following:
H1: Task demands will increase effort substitution.
An organizational mission articulates the purpose of the organization: “why do we
exist?” In a public or non-profit context, organizational missions are mostly about
societal impact, making a difference, or helping clients – hence, the purpose is prosocial
(Knies & Leisink, 2018; Moore, 1995). At the same time, mission statements are
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inclusive and try to be broad enough to serve as “umbrellas” covering an organization’s
many functions and activities. To this extent, missions are (at least partially) at odds with
performance metrics since the latter are the result of strategic prioritization and the
identification of key performance areas. But even in cases in which performance
priorities and mission overlap, a set of quantitative indicators is rarely able to
comprehensively capture the all-encompassing abstract of what is truly desired (Binning
& Lebreton, 2009).
Due to these conceptual and empirical tensions between a mission and
performance metrics, organizations with a strong mission orientation may pay less
attention to a specific set of performance indicators, even when put under pressure. Said
organizations are likely to consider that performance metrics provide an incomplete
picture of the true organizational purpose. Hence, organizations with a strong mission
orientation will not give in to performance pressure by shifting their efforts away from
unmeasured to measured tasks and objectives. Research on individuals and teams who
have a strong sense of purpose and are prone to prosocial motives supports this notion.
Said individuals are less likely to engage in gaming and, as Korsgaard et al., (1997) find,
more likely to appreciate performance feedback – even if negative – and act upon it in
order to improve. Similarly, studies show that prosocial motives foster positive and
voluntary work behaviors, subsumed under the label of organizational citizenship,
including team behaviors (Hu & Liden, 2015) and behaviors that benefit individuals
outside of the organizations (Takeuchi et al., 2015).
A strong mission orientation can also help to set mission-related norms that affect
everyday behavior. As argued before, missions of public and non-profit organizations
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tend to be prosocial and, hence, support prosocial norms and behaviors. Experimental
research in behavioral economics shows that social norms are likely to influence cheating
behavior. For example, being asked to recall the Ten Commandments before conducting
an incentivized performance task made cheating less likely (Ayal et al., 2015). Further,
cheating becomes more likely if similar others (in-group members) indicate that they are
cheating when performing the task (Gino et al., 2009). Overall, this indicates that a strong
orientation on mission may prevent effort substitution as mission focus emphasizes
prosocial norms and behaviors over financial rewards.
In addition to the independent effect of mission orientation, this variable could
also interact with task demands. That is, mission orientation could buffer the reinforcing
effects of task demands on effort substitution.
H2: Mission orientation decreases effort substitution.
H3: Mission orientation mitigates the effect of task demands on effort substitution.
3.5 Data and Methods

3.5.1 Research Context and Data
We examine our theory in the context of schools and the school system. We do
this for two reasons. First, the school system is representative of many cases within
public administration more broadly. It is a hierarchical bureaucracy consisting of multiple
tiers (states, districts, and schools), while at the same time giving a great deal of
discretion to highly professionalized actors at the different tiers, including street-level
bureaucrats (the teachers in the classrooms). Schools are vastly diverse, and comparisons
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across schools offer a large amount of variation in important variables, such as task
demands, which is one of the main factors in our theory. School districts have been
labelled “the most common public organization in the United States” (Meier & O’Toole,
2009, p. 7), and the fact that virtually every country has publicly-managed school systems
makes them a fairly representative case.
Second, schools are a particularly promising case to study performance
management systems. The area of education (particularly schools) has a longstanding
experience with performance systems. Most schools and school districts have gone
through at least one decade of using standardized testing, performance comparisons, and
accountability mechanisms, turning this policy area into a “fertile ground for
demonstrating changing performance measurement regimes and their consequences”
(Lewis & Triantafillou, 2012, p. 606). Furthermore, many cases of the dysfunctions of
performance systems (gaming and cheating) have been reported in the area of education
and schools (for a large-scale analysis on the matter, see Jacob & Levitt, 2003). This
includes prominent cases of teachers and school administrators erasing and correcting
answers on the high-stakes state standardized tests as well as cases of falsifying
graduation rates (e.g., Kasperkevic, 2015; Strauss, 2018).
To test our hypotheses, we study organizations (schools) within one performance
regime (the school district’s system). By focusing on one school district, we aim at
separating performance system-effects on gaming from organization-level variables
because the former are held constant and, hence, equally present for all schools. In
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particular, our sample consists of 268 observations from 64 high schools 1 in the MiamiDade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) district for the 2012-2016 school years. We
chose this case because of the district’s longstanding experience with performance
metrics predating the state system, its relevance within Florida due to population size,
and the availability of data for all relevant variables for multiple years. Further, Dade
County is often considered a “laboratory” for the nation because the population of the
United States is projected to become similarly diverse to that of the county.
While all school districts in Florida apply the same state-wide performance
metrics, the implementation of the system and components to incentivize performance
can vary among districts. The state-wide system assigns school grades between A and F
to schools based on 11 performance criteria related to achievement, learning gains,
graduation rate, and acceleration success (Florida Department of Education, 2017).The
Florida School Recognition Program is a state-wide program that provides financial
rewards to schools and individual educators based on the school grades, therefore
incentivizing the 11 performance measures. In addition to financial rewards, school
grades also serve as measures by which schools are placed under additional scrutiny both
by the individual school district and the state.
Most of the performance-related funding comes from the State of Florida. Schools
that improve a letter grade, maintain an improved letter grade from the previous year, or
receive a “commendable rating” are rewarded with a cash performance bonus from the

1

We included all high schools that are a part of the district’s performance metrics, which excludes
special needs schools and schools for juvenile delinquents. All data used for our analysis are publicly
available: http://oada.dadeschools.net/SchoolPerformanceData/SchoolPerformanceData.asp as well as
http://drs.dadeschools.net/SchoolClimateSurvey/SCS.asp (both retrieved on November 2, 2017).
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Florida School Recognition Program. This includes rewards at the individual level for
principals, teachers, and staff (Florida Department of Education, 2018). However, while
the state pulls the levers in rewards and sanctions through funding, it is the local districts
that actually implement the actions through their discretionary use of funds (Iasevoli,
2016) and their restructuring of individual schools, which include transferring
administrators and teachers when schools do not meet standards (Emma, 2015; Solochek,
2018). Local school districts also reward and sanction schools through promotions of
successful administrators and teachers and demotions of those deemed unsatisfactory
(Cohen et al. 2012; Travis, 2016). Further, school districts have a great deal of discretion
when it comes to the use of funds from block grants to incentivize performance, such as
the Teacher Incentive Fund from the U.S. Department of Education.
Florida has several lists of sanctioned schools. One list is labelled the “300
Lowest Performing Elementary Schools” and another list is labelled “Persistently LowPerforming Schools.” Though such schools receive additional resources and support to
resolve performance inadequacies, the stigma that comes with being on such a list
undoubtedly hurts a school’s image. To add to the image problem, the pressure from
intense oversight on individual teachers and school-level leadership can be
overwhelming. Studies have shown that school staff turnover is related to such external
pressures (e.g., Boyd et al., 2005).
Furthermore, the media often prints the name of school grades, so the public is
fully aware of a school’s status. Neighborhoods and even whole local municipalities will
tout the success of local schools in order to attract homeowners and even businesses to an
area. This is not just an occurrence in Florida, but across the nation. An article in the
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Washington Post summed it up best by stating that good schools are a top factor for
homeowners nationwide when deciding on a home to buy (Lerner, 2015). Because of the
significance of school accountability grades and the salience of the issue, it is a high
likelihood that school officials will pay particular attention to these 11 incentivized
components that make up school accountability grades.
3.5.2 Measuring Effort Substitution
To capture effort substitution, we create variables that measure discrepancies
between rewarded and unrewarded school performance metrics. One rewarded measure
we employ is the graduation rate, whereas unrewarded – but important – indicators are
the dropout, attendance, and mobility (percent of students who transferred in or out a
given school) rates. While we explain in more detail how we created our effort
substitution measures below, this is the approach in a nutshell: We subtract the
unrewarded indicators (dropout, attendance, and mobility) from the rewarded indicator
(graduation rate) and consider high scores as evidence of effort substitution. If schools do
not substitute effort, then scores of rewarded and unrewarded metrics should roughly be
of equal magnitude, resulting in a net difference close to zero. If, however, schools are
doing considerably better on rewarded as opposed to unrewarded statistics, then the net
difference will be positive, suggesting the existence of effort substitution.
In order to provide a comprehensive test of our hypotheses, we replicate our
analysis in two contexts – one in which rewarded and unrewarded measures are
conceptually linked and one in which they are not. In line with prior work, we expect the
graduation rate (our rewarded measure) to be at least somewhat conceptually tied to our
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three unrewarded measures (dropout, attendance, and mobility) (Mishel & Roy, 2006;
O’Toole & Meier, 2011). Although it seems possible to improve a school’s graduation
rate, while neglecting dropout, attendance, and mobility, at some point improvements in
graduation will only be feasible by also enhancing at least one or two of the three
unrewarded metrics. Hence, we introduce a second rewarded measure, which we believe
is less related to the three metrics that are not rewarded.
This measure is the acceleration success rate, which is the “percentage of
graduates from the graduation rate cohort who earned a passing score on an acceleration
examination, such as advanced placement or the International Baccalaureate exam, a
passing grade in a dual enrolment course that qualified for college credit, or earned an
industry certification” (Florida Department of Education 2016, p.2). In essence, the
acceleration success rate is a measure of the percentage of students who did not just
graduate, but obtained college or career readiness qualifications. Since this is a very high
standard of performance, which is only relevant for a subpopulation of students, we
believe schools are able to improve in this area, while entirely neglecting overall dropout,
attendance, or mobility rates.
In total, we are using two rewarded and three unrewarded measures of
performance, which are listed in Table 3 and accompanied by brief definitions. Our
rewarded measures (graduation and acceleration) are cohort-based, which is why we also
converted the dropout rate into a cohort-based variable. Attendance and mobility rates
could not be transformed into cohort-based measures because both metrics were not
broken down by grade level for each year in the data set. However, both metrics did not
show too much fluctuations within schools over the panel years. Before subtracting
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unrewarded from rewarded measures, we created z-scores to make all five scales
comparable. The scales for dropout and mobility were reversed, so that high z-scores on
all five measures capture “positive” performance.

Table 3: Effort Substitution Measures and Factor Structure
Measures
Definition

Factor Loadingsc
Acceleration Graduation
Gaming
Gaming
-0.070
0.927

Graduation vs. This is the difference between
Dropout
graduation ratesa (rewarded) and
(reversed coded) dropout ratesa
(unrewarded).
Graduation vs. This is the difference between
0.138
0.784
Attendance
graduation ratesa (rewarded) and
attendance ratesb (unrewarded).
Graduation vs. This is the difference between
-0.032
0.918
Mobility
graduation ratesa (rewarded) and
(reversed coded) mobility ratesb
(unrewarded).
Acceleration
This is the difference between
0.726
0.253
vs. Dropout
acceleration success ratesa (rewarded)
and (reversed coded) dropout ratesa
(unrewarded).
This is the difference between
0.995
-0.093
Acceleration
a
vs. Attendance acceleration success rates (rewarded)
and attendance ratesb (unrewarded).
Acceleration
This is the difference between
0.950
-0.016
vs. Mobility
acceleration success ratesa (rewarded)
and (reversed coded) mobility ratesb
(unrewarded).
Eigenvalue
3.715
1.206
Notes: a = cohort-based; b = single-year based; c = principal component factoring with
promax rotation; acceleration success rate = percentage of students acquiring college
credits or industrial credits for trade school prior to graduation; mobility rate = percent
of students who transferred in or out a given school.
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The combination of all rewarded and unrewarded measures allows us to create six
effort-substitution variables. For the purpose of data reduction, we factor analysed the six
variables, and the results can also be found in Table 3. The six variables load on two
factors – acceleration gaming and graduation gaming – with significant Eigenvalues and
no considerable cross-loadings. We use these two factor scores as dependent variables in
our effort substitution regression models.
3.5.3 Independent Variables
One of our main independent variables is task demands, measured as the
percentage of Black students in a school and also socioeconomic status, based on the
percentage of students on free or reduced lunch. In the context of schools, the minority
status of students is often a proxy measure of task demands because schools with large
minority populations tend to have lower standardized test scores (Bothe & Meier, 2000;
Rong & Grant, 1992).2
The second variable of main interest is mission orientation. We distinguish levels
of mission orientation using a dummy variable for public versus charter schools,
assuming that – on average – charter schools are more mission oriented. Charter schools
are often founded for a specific purpose, and this purpose is articulated in their charter
and mission statement, guiding their everyday operations. Although we expect variation
across charter schools, research has shown that they are also somewhat homogenous

2

Hispanic students are also often considered to be a disenfranchised group that requires higher
teaching demands. However, unlike in Texas or California, Hispanic students do not have the same status
in South Florida (Gay, 2006; Mohl, 1990). In fact, in our data set schools’ percentage of Hispanic students
is negatively correlated with the percentage of Black and low-income students, which is why we do not
include this group in our measures of task demands.
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regarding a strong internal focus on the implementation of their charter/mission (Ford &
Ihrke, 2016) as well as a strong teacher community (a construct that includes teachers’
shared beliefs and values) (Cannata, 2007). Since charter schools may not just differ from
public schools regarding mission and purpose but also with respect to performance, size,
climate, and resources, we control for these factors, whose measurement we explain
further below.
Of course, some public schools may be more mission oriented than some charter
schools, which will likely increase measurement error in this dummy variable and noise
in our statistical findings. Hence, we employ a second measure that we call “mission
specificity.” To create this measure, we conducted a content analysis of all schools’
mission statements (every school has such a statement), similar to approaches used in
previous scholarship (Boerema, 2006; Garrow & Gursky 2013; see also Desmidt, 2016).
We employ a dummy variable to differentiate between “any mission” (0) and missions
that emphasize a philosophical value, such as having a particular worldview or a nontraditional service delivery approach (1). The idea is that schools with missions, which
champion a specific educational approach, may also provide specific operational
guidance to educators and, thus, are more influential in shaping behavior. Administrators
are less likely to ignore a mission if it reflects the unique purpose of the school’s
existence as opposed to any school’s generic purpose, which is simply to educate
students.
We corroborated the mission information on the schools by also reviewing
websites or school improvement plans for further evidence on their approach to
education. The following statement is an example for a generic mission:
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We provide the highest quality education so that all of our students are
empowered to lead productive and fulfilling lives as lifelong learners and
responsible citizens.
The targeting of a specific student group (boys versus girls or a focus on the arts,
sciences, or college readiness) was not sufficient to be coded “1” on our mission
specificity variables, which required a unique philosophical or educational approach. The
following statements are examples of missions we coded “1.”
[…] is dedicated to empower students with the knowledge to understand and care
for the environment. […] will provide students with preparation, encouragement
and inspiration for higher learning. Our ultimate goal is to prepare students to
become environmental ambassadors of humanity and to deliver the message that a
sustainable relationship with the Earth is possible.
[…] The core philosophy and underlying purpose of […] is reflected in the
following concepts: High expectations for students and teachers: Creative
endeavours as an integral part of the growth and development of all students,
Character development, Increase of self-esteem through mechanisms that ensure
the improvement of students’ self-image as learners, Parental involvement,
Student ownership of their learning through self-awareness of their learning styles
and self-monitoring of their learning, Student and teacher accountability,
Commitment to the ideal that success breeds success […]
At […], our faculty is committed to empowering our students through mentorship
to be held accountable by teaching them to embrace responsibility, demonstrate
mutual respect, and engage in open communication. Our continuous collaboration
of all stakeholders will provide a safe and nurturing environment which promotes
students’ social-emotional and academic growth. […] Through our endeavours
and dedication to community service, our students will achieve their full potential
and become productive members of society.
There was no change over time in mission statements in our study period, which
is why this variable is static within schools. The fact that our charter-school and missionspecificity dummy variables are positively but moderately correlated (r=0.38) shows that
both pick up on the same latent idea (“mission orientation”) but are still different enough
to be captured by two variables.
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We include the following control variables, all measured at the school level:
performance grade, size, climate, focus on performance data, and lack of resources. We
do this for two reasons. First, we want to account for differences between public and
charter schools other than mission orientation. Second, we think these variables may
impact gaming behavior. For example, gaming may be more restricted in larger schools
that have more structure and formalization and involve more actors in the decisionmaking. At the same time, a lack of resources could make administrators more desperate
and likely to engage in practices such as effort substitution.
School size is measured by the number of students. The other three variables are
constructed based on single items from the M-DCPS annual school climate survey given
to staff members and averaged at each school. The three variables are measured using 5point Likert scales, and their wording is as follows: “The overall climate or atmosphere at
my school is positive and helps students learn” (climate); “annual teacher evaluations are
used to improve teacher performance” (performance focus); and “I am limited by
insufficient resources (e.g., books, equipment, supplies etc.)” (lack of resources). The
descriptives and correlations of all variables can be found in Table 4.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean (SD)
0.00 (1.00)

Range
-4.47 –
2.40

(1)
1.00

(2)

0.00 (1.00)

0.48

1.00

69.47 (19.40)

-9.60 –
2.08
4 – 96

0.24

1.00

23.29 (28.18)

0 – 95.5

0.35

0.06
0.18

0.35

1.00

0.23 (--)

0–1

6. Mission specificity

0.17 (--)

0–1

7. Performance grade

3.23 (0.88)

1–4

0.05
0.02
0.03

8. Size

1,688.25
(1,014.04)
4.05 (0.44)

112 –
4,244
2.6 – 5

0.51
0.17
0.06
0.23

0.22
0.05
0.07
0.21

10. Focus on
performance data

3.41 (0.38)

2.26 – 4.82

0.28
0.13

0.32
0.15
0.06
0.06
0.36
0.34

11. Lack of resources

2.85 (0.63)

1.21 – 4.68

0.11

0.36

1. Acceleration
gaming
2. Graduation gaming
3. Percent lowincome students
4. Percent Black
students
5. Charter Schools

9. Climate

0.21
0.32

0.05
0.04
0.09

0.14

0.01
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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.00
0.38

1.00

0.15

0.13

1.00

0.53
0.35

0.19
0.13

0.11
0.07

0.47

0.15

0.06

0.23

0.06

0.09

1.00
0.23
0.25

1.00
0.38

1.00

0.16

0.34

0.48

Table 5: Acceleration gaming models: Unlinked performance measures
DV: Focus on college and career acceleration as opposed to unrewarded measures^
Models
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Task demands
Percent low-income students
0.007**
0.005
0.007**
0.003
(0.004)
(0.181)
(0.020)
(0.429)
Percent Black students
0.006**
0.011**
0.006**
0.012**
(0.016)
(0.000)
(0.008)
(0.000)
Mission orientation
Schools with charters
-1.381**
-2.450**
(0.000)
(0.000)
*
Mission specificity
-0.279
-0.371**
(0.082)
(0.014)
Interactions
Percent low-income students x
-0.008
schools with charters
(0.142)
Percent black students x schools with
-0.059**
charters
(0.000)
Percent low-income students x
0.008
mission specificity
(0.178)
Percent black students x mission
-0.011*
specificity
(0.051)
Control variables
Performance grade
Size
Climate
Focus on performance data
Lack of resources
Constant
Dummies for years 2012-2016
included

0.084*
(0.085)
-0.000**
(0.021)
0.119
(0.380)
-0.178
(0.172)
-0.071
(0.535)
-0.044
(0.960)
Yes

0.057
(0.396)
0.000
(0.266)
0.005
(0.973)
-0.536**
(0.000)
-0.147
(0.240)
1.293
(0.258)
Yes

0.089*
(0.066)
-0.000**
(0.027)
0.087
(0.507)
-0.202
(0.105)
-0.047
(0.692)
0.712
(0.415)
Yes

0.068
(0.313)
0.000
(0.223)
-0.023
(0.881)
-0.517**
(0.000)
-0.146
(0.248)
1.898*
(0.069)
Yes

N
268
268
268
268
R2
0.425
0.259
0.449
0.267
adj. R2
0.398
0.224
0.418
0.226
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05; p-values in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at
the school level; pooled OLS regressions; ^ unrewarded measures: dropout, attendance,
and mobility rates
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Table 6: Graduation gaming models: Linked performance measures
DV: Focus on graduation rates as opposed to unrewarded measures^
Models
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Task difficulty
Percent low-income students
-0.007**
-0.007**
-0.013**
-0.009**
(0.034)
(0.022)
(0.000)
(0.010)
0.008**
0.010**
0.010**
Percent Black students
0.008**
(0.010)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
Mission orientation
Schools with charters
-0.129
-1.108**
(0.694)
(0.043)
Mission specificity
0.007
-0.113
(0.973)
(0.475)
Interactions
Percent low-income students x
0.010
schools with charters
(0.151)
Percent black students x schools with
-0.061**
charters
(0.014)
Percent low-income students x
0.009
mission specificity
(0.199)
Percent black students x mission
-0.014**
specificity
(0.010)
Controls
Performance grade
Size
Climate
Focus on performance data
Lack of resources
Constant
Dummies for years 2012-2016
included

0.049
(0.309)
-0.000
(0.562)
-0.040
(0.874)
-0.169
(0.265)
-0.179
(0.333)
1.469
(0.301)
Yes

0.044
(0.366)
-0.000
(0.591)
-0.053
(0.822)
-0.205
(0.139)
-0.187
(0.283)
1.618
(0.175)
Yes

0.066
(0.162)
-0.000
(0.818)
-0.088
(0.719)
-0.134
(0.302)
-0.088
(0.647)
0.837
(0.549)
Yes

0.057
(0.263)
-0.000
(0.725)
-0.088
(0.711)
-0.185
(0.182)
-0.190
(0.289)
1.328
(0.278)
Yes

N
268
268
268
268
R2
0.088
0.086
0.140
0.101
adj. R2
0.045
0.043
0.093
0.052
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05; p-values in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered
at the school level; pooled OLS regressions; ^ unrewarded measures: dropout,
attendance, and mobility rates
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3.6 Results

To test our hypotheses, we run models using our two effort substitution measures
as dependent variables (acceleration and graduation gaming) and our measures of task
demands, mission orientation, and their interaction as well as a set of controls as
independent variables.3 All continuous measures that make up the interaction terms were
mean-centred before we multiplied them to simplify the interpretation of the interactive
models. We pool all observations across years and estimate OLS regressions since there
is no or very little change across time in most of our independent variables of interest,
which conceptually is in line with previous research on schools and other public
organizations (Andrews, 2010; O’Toole & Meier, 2010 and 2011) and statistically the
most appropriate choice for our data. 4 Positive regression coefficients indicate increases
in effort substitution in favour of the rewarded performance measure.
Table 5 shows the regression results using acceleration gaming (a focus on
college and career acceleration as opposed to dropout, attendance, and mobility rates) as
the dependent variable. Here, rewarded (acceleration) and unrewarded (the other three
rates) performance measures are not strongly conceptually tied to each other, which is

3

Our main specification is this: ES = β0 + β1 TD + β2 MO + β3 (TD x MO) + β4 C + μ + ε, where
all betas are estimable parameters, μ represents the year fixed effects, and ε is the error term. We run
multiple variations of this equation because effort substitution (ES) is captured through graduation and
acceleration gaming; task demands (TD) through percent low-income students and percent Black students;
and mission orientation (MO) through schools with charters and mission specificity. The controls (C) in all
models are performance grade, size, climate, focus on performance data, and lack of resources. OLS
Diagnostics are found under Appendix 3.
4

The use of school-fixed effects would require substantive over-time change in our main
variables, and the Hausman Test rejects the application of random effects in at least half of our models. To
account for the panel structure of the data, we employ robust standard errors clustered as the school level
and a set of year dummies.
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why it is possible to improve the former and neglect the latter. Models one and two
examine the effects of task demands and mission orientation, where the first model
employs the charter school dummy and the second model the mission specificity dummy
to capture mission orientation. Model three and four test the interactive effects, where the
former includes the interactions with the charter dummy and the latter those with the
specificity dummy.
Models one and two provide evidence for the effect of task demands and mission
orientation. All six coefficients show the expected signs and five out these six are
statistically significant. Hence, task demands seem to reinforce effort substitution, and
mission orientation reduces it. In the interactions models three and four, we see that that
three out of four coefficients show the expected negative sign and two coefficients (the
interactions with percent Black students) achieve statistical significance. This is at least
partial support for the hypothesis that mission orientation can attenuate the reinforcing
effect of task demands on effort substitution. A further inspection of the marginal effects
for the significant interactions provide some additional insights (results not reported in
table). For our interactions, the effect of percent Black students on acceleration gaming
turns from being significantly positive (if charter = 0) to negative (if charter = 1) and
from significantly positive (if mission specificity = 0) to being zero (if mission specificity
= 1).
Some of our control variables yield interesting findings. Generally, effort
substitution practices seem to be more prominent among high-performing schools,
possibly because these schools have more to lose than those at the bottom. Effort
substitution is less likely in larger schools and those in which performance data have
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become a part of regular management practices. Larger schools may have a more
transparent accountability structure, and schools which use performance data for the
purpose of improvement may be less likely to game such data.
Table 6 shows the regression results for our second effort substitution variable –
graduation gaming. This time, the rewarded performance measure (graduation rate) is
conceptually more closely tied to the unrewarded measures (dropout, attendance,
mobility rates). That is, it is more difficult to substitute effort because graduation gains
may be linked to gains in the other areas. The table is structured the same way as the
previous one. Now, the findings appear to be much more mixed. Only two out of four
task demands coefficients show the expected effects. While mission orientation has no
independent impact on graduation gaming, it significantly mitigates the reinforcing effect
of task demands on effort substitution in two out of four tests. The control variables show
no impact, and all models in table 4 perform much worse than those in table 3 regarding
their explanatory power.
We further explore our findings by examining whether the effects of our main
variables change in different contexts, that is, for different values of our control variables.
To do so, we return to our findings from table 3, which shows the expected significant
effects on acceleration gaming (a case where rewarded and unrewarded performance
measures do not conceptually overlap). We rerun our models and now interact each main
variable at a time (percent low-income students, percent Black students, schools with
charters, and mission specificity) with all context variables (performance grade, size,
climate, focus on performance data, and lack of resources), resulting in four separate
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specifications each of which includes one main variable and five interactions with that
variable (results not shown).
The main take away is that we do not see much change in coefficients for
different levels of the context variables, with a few exceptions. A lack of resources
reinforces the effect of task demands on effort substitution, particularly for schools
serving low-income families. Further, larger schools seem to be better able to deal with
high task demands, as they show a significantly weaker link between task demands
(percent Black students) and effort substitution. At the same time, larger schools appear
to be less capable of leveraging the benefits of a strong mission orientation. For these
schools, mission specificity is significantly less impactful in reducing effort substitution.

3.7 Discussion

In this study, we have examined performance scores of high schools in one school
district. By studying one district, we are able to hold all performance-system related
factors constant and leverage the organization-level variation among schools. We
construct two measures of effort substitution (acceleration gaming and graduation
gaming) by comparing whether schools do better on rewarded indicators (career
acceleration and graduations rates) as opposed to unrewarded ones (dropout, attendance,
and mobility rates). We find consistent evidence that task demands are associated with
effort substitution and partial evidence that mission orientation is linked to mitigating it
and moderates the task effect. However, we also see significant differences in the results
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based on whether rewarded and unrewarded performance measures are conceptually
linked or not.
In this section, we discuss our findings and explain their implications and
contributions. First, the paper contributes to the development of a tangible theory of
performance gaming. While previous research has documented evidence for gaming (e.g.,
Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Hood, 2006; Jacob & Levitt, 2003), little is known about
organizational factors triggering gaming, particularly explanations beyond the attributes
of the performance system itself. Our paper categorizes types of gaming, focuses on one
of these types (effort substitution), and develops and tests three specific hypotheses.
Second, our findings help to better contextualize effort substitution theory.
Although our two effort substitution measures (acceleration and graduation gaming) are
reasonably well correlated (r=0.48), our theory about the effects of task demands and
mission orientation turns out to work much better for the former, which consists of
rewarded and unrewarded performance indicators that are conceptually disconnected. In
cases in which such indicators are not much linked, decision-makers are being put in a
position to make real choices, where doing more of A automatically means doing less of
B. When dealing with trade-offs and tough decisions, managers are more susceptible to
external pressure (task demands) and likely to look for a moral compass (purpose).
However, when decisions are less controversial, factors like these will be less influential.
Third, the finding that task demands foster effort substitution has important social
equity implications. In a government setting, dealing with difficult tasks often means
working with underserved populations, which might end up doubly disadvantaged in
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performance systems where effort substitution occurs. The first disadvantage is that these
groups are usually facing other societal problems outside the control of government
agencies. In the context of schools, this might include the effects of crime, domestic
issues in the home, and limited access to resources such as transportation and technology,
which can all affect student achievement and make meeting performance standards
difficult. The second disadvantage comes from what we found in this study – schools
with a higher percentage of disadvantaged students are associated with more effort
substitution, indicating that such students might be neglected in receiving educational
services in unrewarded areas at the expense of the school trying to meet rewarded
performance standards.
Our findings for the mitigating and moderating impact of mission orientation
were not as consistent as those for task demands. One explanation could be that positive
and negative effects of mission orientation can cancel each other out. As expected, in
some cases a strong mission orientation may create resistance to gaming behaviors and
effort substitution because the latter rarely benefit clients and help accomplish the
mission. However, in other cases in which performance metrics are considered to be at
odds with the organization’s mission, shortcuts “around the system” could be perceived
to be a legitimate strategy to focus on mission as well as meet the formal requirements set
by the performance system. Our findings call for further research with respect to
reinforcing and conflicting effects of mission versus performance orientations.
Like other studies, our paper is prone to limitations. The first is that our measures
of mission orientation are proxies, which are able to capture the existence and content of
school charters and missions, but not their implementation. In addition, mission
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statements do not capture actual behavior of mission alignment. Measuring the true
extent to which a mission statement or charter affects school administrators’ decisions
and behavior would require a survey of multiple informants for each site with high
response rates as well as detailed qualitative observations. Yet, the use of school types
and missions statements to distinguish among different degrees of mission orientation is a
proven practice (Boerema, 2006; Desmidt, 2016; Garrow & Gursky, 2013; Henig et al.,
2005). The second limitation is related to the generalizability of our findings since we
study the performance system of one school district as our case. This strategy allowed us
to hold all system-related variables constant, but our results may be prone to picking up
on some of the idiosyncrasies of the case. However, the observations we make in our case
seem compatible with what others have found in other states and school districts (e.g.,
Bohte & Meier, 2000; Radin, 2006). Furthermore, the performance system we study
seems to share typical features of the “average” system: data are linked to consequences
but measures are incomprehensive and performance contracts incomplete, hence,
allowing for effort substitution and gaming.
We see three specific recommendations for the management of performance
systems and the mitigation of effort substitution. First, key performance indicators need
to capture all relevant performance dimensions. While no performance system is
“perfect” or able to measure everything (in fact, too many indicators can be
counterproductive as well), the selected indicators should be broad enough to capture
changes in all mission-relevant, but also important non-mission based (social equity,
procedural justice, social trust etc.), areas. Performance systems can still be strategic and
prioritize certain objective over others, but if managers are not supposed to generate gains
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in rewarded areas at the expense of unrewarded ones, then system designers need to
attach at least some rewards to non-priority targets and indicators that measure negative
unintended consequences.
Second, benchmarking needs to account for varying task demands. Administrators
tend to engage in effort substitution practices if tasks are difficult and performance
targets perceived to be unachievable through other managerial means. Hence, absolute
targets and across-the-board minimum standards can be counterproductive, and
perceptions of stretch targets vary across contexts. Systems could attach higher rewards
to relative performance gains (using an “added-value” perspective) than overall levelimprovements. Or, organizations could be divided into benchmarking clusters based on
the task demands they are facing, rather than employing league tables that compare all
organizations in the same ranking.
Third, performance systems need to be accompanied by norms that emphasize the
organizational mission and purpose. The understanding of, and identification with, an
organization’s purpose has the potential to mitigate against managerial short cuts and
dysfunctional behaviors such as effort substitution. While helpful to meet targets in the
short-term, these behaviors are likely to harm clients and reduce impact in the long-run.
Hence, performance system designers need to ensure that metrics and purpose are not
perceived to be disconnected from each other. Rather, systems need to emphasize that
performance metrics are supposed to support, visualize, and improve the organization’s
value.
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3.8 Conclusion

Examples of gaming and cheating as a response to performance systems have
become too common to be dismissed as outliers or exceptions. This paper contributes to a
theory of performance gaming, as it studies why public organizations engage in effort
substitution (i.e., directing effort towards rewarded as opposed to unrewarded areas). We
argue that effort substitution becomes more likely if tasks are difficult; less likely in the
presence of a strong mission orientation; and that mission orientation is linked to
mitigating the task demands effect. We test these hypotheses by examining a five-year
panel data set of 64 high schools in one school district, which allows us to hold all
performance system-related factors constant.
We find support for the effect of task demands and partial support for the main
and interactive effects of mission orientation. We think this is intriguing since dealing
with difficult tasks in a government setting often means working with underserved
populations, which may end up doubly disadvantaged if improvements in one area are
traded for null effects in another. In particular, we see support for the hypotheses when
rewarded and unrewarded measures capture different dimensions of performance and,
hence, put decision-makers in a position to make real choices. Results are mixed when
rewarded and unrewarded measures are conceptually linked. Our findings suggest that
our theory holds when stakes are high but that task demands and purpose are less
influential driving forces when decisions are less controversial.

89

IV. ESSAY 3: DOES PROSOCIAL IMPACT REDUCE PERFORMANCE DATA
GAMING? THE ROLE OF DATA VISUALIZATIONS AND EXPERT-NOVICE
DIFFERENCES
4.1 Abstract

While research has documented the framing effects of performance data on
decision-making, little is known about the impact of data visualizations on performance
gaming. We propose that prosocial impact information (when qualitative and visualizing
benefits for clients in need) reduces gaming. We also point to expert-novice differences
and suggest that impact information is less influential among experts, with some
exceptions. We conduct an experiment with samples of citizens (novices) and school
leaders (experts) in which subjects have to decide whether they are willing to omit poorly
performing students when calculating school-wide performance scores. We find that
school leaders game less than citizens, and that the former are less responsive to
visualizations of prosocial impact data cues than the latter. However, impact information
becomes more influential if it can grab school leaders’ attention and if leaders have little
work experience. More broadly, our findings suggest being cautious with generalizations
across citizen and manager samples. So, there is evidence to suggest that when
performance data is presented with a prosocial perspective, public managers and citizens
will engage in less performance gaming. However, public managers and citizens differ in
how they perceive performance data and under what conditions.
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4.2 Introduction

Research on performance information use has documented how design choices,
framing effects, and cognitive biases affect public managers’ decisions and behaviors
(Moynihan et al., 2017; Andersen & Moynihan, 2016; Webeck & Nicholson-Crotty,
2019). While findings explain, for example, how different ways to present performance
information alter managerial decision outcomes, little is known about dysfunctional data
use: to what extent do differential visualization of the same information mitigate
performance gaming or cheating?
Meanwhile, the literature on performance gaming is growing, suggesting that
most incentive systems also yield unintended, dysfunctional responses (Eterno &
Silverman, 2012; Soss et al., 2011), which can be highly detrimental even if such
responses are not dominating the entire system (Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Kelman &
Friedman, 2009). To that effect, scholarship in public administration has examined how
organizational factors and system configurations influence gaming and cheating (Benaine
& Kroll, 2019; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010), with lesser attention devoted to cognitive
and value-driven mechanisms.
In this paper, we aim to bridge these two literatures. We examine how the
different framing of performance information regarding its prosocial impact affects the
odds of public managers, who are exposed to this information, to engage in gaming
behaviors. Based on previous work in this area, we propose a general model, where
prosocial impact information, specifically when qualitative (as opposed to quantitative)
and when visualizing benefits for clients in need, reduces performance gaming. Our main
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rationale is that seeing vivid visualizations of one’s prosocial impact makes people
engage in behaviors that can maximize effect, rather than undermining potentially real
impact through data manipulation. At the same time, we argue that general framing
effects of information may matter more for novices as opposed to area experts whose
behavior is a function of specialized knowledge and professional socialization. We
suggest two adjustments to the general model. Prosocial impact information is likely to
reduce performance gaming among experts if experts are still relatively inexperienced
and if the data can grab experts’ attention.
To test our theory, we conduct a randomized experiment with samples of citizens
(novices) and school leaders (area experts). We put subjects in a hypothetical scenario in
which they have to decide whether they want to omit individual students when
calculating a school-wide performance score. Subjects will be considered “successful” in
our scenario when they meet a predefined target, whose achievement essentially requires
the omission of the weakest students. At the same time, subjects are notified that omitted
students will be transferred out of the school, taking away their chance to participate in
the school’s student improvement program. All subjects are randomly divided in four
groups, receiving different visualizations of positive performance information (PI) for the
student improvement program (quantitative PI, qualitative PI, qualitative PI emphasizing
impact on Black students, and no PI). We create a measure of performance gaming as our
dependent variable by adding the number of students omitted, weighted by how poorly a
student was performing.
In line with our model, we find significant differences between ordinary citizens
and school leaders. While qualitative impact information, particularly when visualizing a
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positive effect for Black students, makes it less likely for citizens to engage in
performance gaming, we see no such effect for the school leader group. When further
examining the group of school leaders, we see that impact information is more influential
the lesser experienced the school leader is. Further, we find that the more attention that
group devoted to studying the impact information, the larger its mitigating effect on
performance gaming.

4.3 General Model of How Prosocial Impact Reduces Performance Gaming

In this section, we propose a general theory of how prosocial impact information
is linked to performance gaming. In doing so, we draw on previous studies that have
examined the framing effects of performance data and prosocial impact conditions (e.g.,
Belle, 2013a; Grant, 2008a; Olsen, 2017), although none of these studies utilized
performance gaming as the outcome variable. In the subsequent section, we suggest
specific adjustments to our general model that account for the differences between
novices and experts as potential data users.
We understand performance gaming as generating positive performance data
without achieving the indicator’s underlying objective. Gaming can be done through
manipulating data or resources (Benaine & Kroll, 2019). One specific type of gaming we
turn to in this study is cream skimming. This involves selecting clients that are easier to
serve as well as underserving undesirable clients or excluding them from performance
metrics or reports (Bohte & Meier, 2000; Koning & Heinrich, 2013). We define prosocial
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impact information as performance data that link public service actions and outputs to
measurable impact on clients or citizens. Like indicators for short-term outcomes,
prosocial impact information tends to portray the immediate effect on clients, and it
captures impact descriptively rather than being able to prove causality. Unlike short-term
outcome data, we expect prosocial impact information to measure substantive changes in
behaviors or achievements, excluding indicators for lower-order outcomes such as
program participation or satisfaction. In that sense, all prosocial impact data can be
considered outcomes, but not all outcomes are necessarily impact data (Hatry, 2006; Van
Dooren et al., 2015). In this paper, however, we use the two terms, prosocial impact data
and performance information, interchangeably to be able to connect to previous research
that has mostly employed the latter term.
A great deal of the literature on performance systems borrows its assumptions
from agency theory, suggesting that better specified – more complete – contracts with
measurable outcomes may constrain opportunistic behavior among agents (Kettl, 1997;
Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). Research on prosociality offers an alternative mechanism
to align the individuals’ interest with the organizational mission (Bolino & Grant, 2016).
If bureaucrats are aware of the prosocial impact they have, they will likely put more
effort into their public service work. Along these lines, perceived prosocial impact can
motivate purposeful in-role and extra role behaviors as well as mission-based
performance. Consider the following examples.
High levels of prosocial impact make public managers care about, and act upon,
performance data (Moynihan et al., 2012). Increased prosocial impact created through
interactions between public service providers and direct beneficiaries increased the
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providers’ long-term productivity significantly (Grant, 2008a). Similarly, Belle (2013a)
observed prosocial impact in nurses’ personal encounters. When nurses, who made
healthcare kits, saw healthcare workers using these kits, the nurses made fewer errors and
demonstrated higher productivity in their work. Cumulatively then, prosocial impact
seems to motivate bureaucrats to increase performance through real improvements, rather
than increasing performance scores on paper via the manipulation of data or effort.
Acting prosocially and ethically when conducting government work are
behaviors, which are both based on the same principle: fostering the public interest
(Wright et al., 2016). Accordingly, research shows that unethical behavior is more related
to self-interest instead of people’s other orientation (Gino, 2015), and prosocial
motivation specifically has been found to be at odds with lying in a set of dice game
experiments (Olsen et al., 2018). Further, in line with social exchange theory, there is
evidence that seeing ethical behavior and morality in others triggers one’s own prosocial
behavior (O’Keefe et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2017).
Overall, we argue that whether managers respond purposefully or dysfunctionally
to targets and requirements is a function of how meaningful they perceive performance
information to be. If data can portray the immediate impact of one’s work on others’
lives, managers may consider such data as instructive and helpful rather than a means
with no end or a part of a technocratic compliance exercise. Put another way, prosocial
impact information provides meaning and makes performance systems less likely to
appear as an external burden with little utility, which could otherwise serve as a
justification to manipulate data and performance.

95

H1: Prosocial impact information reduces performance gaming.
Impact information, like other performance data, can be presented and portrayed
in several ways. For the most part, public agencies report performance data in a
quantitative and aggregated format following a predefined reporting routine, although we
know that a great deal of performance feedback that agencies act upon is nonroutine
qualitative information (Kroll, 2013). Along the same lines, government performance
information has been differentiated in statistical (“hard numbers”) and episodic (“stories
about specific cases”) information (Olsen, 2017).
In his classic critique of the utility of management information systems,
Mintzberg (1975) argues that performance information created through such systems is
mostly simplistic and backward-looking and, hence, inferior to soft and rich qualitative
feedback that can be collected on the spot. Similarly, research in public administration
has shown that public managers prefer nonroutine, qualitative feedback as opposed to
routine, quantitative data (Kroll, 2013), although the use of both information types can
complement each other (Tantardini, 2019). Using a set of experiments, Olsen (2017)
shows that subjects are better able to recall episodic, qualitative information about public
service performance compared to quantitative data because the former invokes greater
emotional responses. In our conceptualization of qualitative impact information, we
certainly include images, such as those of public service beneficiaries, acknowledging
that images and symbols have proven to show a significant effect on how the
performance of public service provision is perceived (Alon-Barkat & Gilad, 2017).
Overall, we argue that qualitative impact information is able to provide a narrative for
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specific cases, which is often more convincing and relatable than averaged or aggregated
large-scale data.
H2: Qualitative prosocial impact information is more influential than quantitative
impact data in reducing performance gaming.
A second qualification of the effect of prosocial impact information on
performance gaming is related to the characteristics of the client group at which the
positive impact is directed. Specifically, we propose the effect of impact information
increases if the beneficiaries of the public service will be considered historically
disadvantaged. We think this is the case because public values, such as racial equity and
minority protections, which are also known to shape the behavior of bureaucrats
(Bozeman & Johnson, 2015) are much more widely supported today than decades ago
(although the ways how to achieve such objectives are still discussed controversially, see
Banerjee, Gupta, and Villeval 2018; Dynarski 2018). To that effect, race is described as
being “more persistent and more influential” than any other demographic in public policy
(Meier, 2016, p. 9).
Research shows that Americans generally support helping the poor but disagree
on what government’s role should be and how help should be given (Howard et al.,
2017). This holds true despite the fact that motivations to help as well as general attitudes
towards disadvantaged groups can be shaped by stigma, racial paternalism, and varying
perceptions of deservingness as well as double standards (Maynard-Moody & Musheno,
2012; Oorschot, 2000). For example, children are often considered more deserving than
adult groups of historically disadvantaged populations (Meanwell & Swando, 2013; Will,
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1993). Most broadly, we propose that prosocial impact information is particularly
influential if the client group they report on is considered disadvantaged.
H3: Qualitative prosocial impact information becomes more influential if it
portrays benefits for historically disadvantaged groups.

4.4 Theoretical Adjustments for Expert-Novice Differences

An important point in our argument is that we propose adjustments to our model
based on expert-novice differences. While so far mostly neglected in the literature, we
suggest that the visualizations of prosocial impact data cues outlined above are less
influential if decision-makers are area experts as opposed to novice decision-makers. We
argue that expert decision-making is a function of expertise, professional norms, and
socialization, and it is less susceptible to different presentations of the same impact
information. Put differently, we expect prosocial impact information to be generally less
influential in mitigating performance gaming behavior for managers who are area
experts.
Experts’ behavior is often driven by professional norms and socialization (Grøn,
et al., 2019; Moyson et al., 2018). Expertise feeds into naturalistic decision making,
where experience creates a knowledge base for shaping decisions (Rosen et al., 2009).
Recent research shows that decision-making can be based on intuition and experience
over analytical sources (Hine et al., 2018). Experts may develop greater dependence on
their own expertise because they have also developed greater knowledge-sharing
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mechanisms through their social interactions and have become more accustomed to the
norms of their organization (Manaf et al., 2018).
With regard to performance information use, there is scattered evidence showing
that information preferences among area experts (administrators, internal stakeholders)
and the general public (citizens, external stakeholders ) differ, in that the former prefer
feedback about processes and effectiveness, while the latter favor data on equity and
information drawn from opinion surveys (Walker et al., 2018; Woolum, 2011). If
experience matters, it does in a way in which managers with less experience are more
likely to consider and act upon performance data (Kroll, 2015). Experts might think that
they know already everything they need to know, constraining their information
screening behavior and making it prone to confirmation bias and patterns of motivation
reasoning (Kahan, 2016). While often being less data-driven than novices (Hershey &
Walsh, 2000), experts are known to make effective intuitive decisions based on specific
knowledge, pattern recognition, and automaticity (Salas et al., 2010). Overall, we argue
that decision-making tendencies among experts and novices vary, and that we expect
prosocial impact information to be less effective in shaping experts’ behavior.
H4: The negative effect of prosocial impact information on performance gaming
is stronger for novices than experts.
A second theoretical adjustment is that prosocial impact information is more
influential if it can grab experts’ attention. Business research has argued that information
flow and the direction of attention are as important to understanding firm behavior and
performance as factors such as resources or capabilities (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 1997).
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Once experts pay attention to impact information, they are likely to get more out of it
than novices. They are better able to make sense of such feedback because they possess
the knowledge base to contextualize new pieces of information, and they are able to make
quick but accurate judgements (Salas et al., 2010). Along these lines, when devoting
attention to impact information, “more experienced managers can be expected to place
more weight on relevant (functional) cues and less on irrelevant (peripheral) cues”
(Perkins & Rao, 1990, p. 2). Expert managers can get a great deal out of impact
information and scorecards (Naranjo-Gil, 2009), but our point is that such an effect only
materializes if experts actually consider impact information when making decisions.
When experts pay more attention to information, it will play a larger role in their
decision-making than it would have been if the experts were novices. The literature
shows that experts are better at sense-making of information (Salas et al., 2010) and so
we argue that experts’ attention will be important in reducing performance gaming when
added with prosocial impact.
H5: The negative effect of prosocial impact information on performance gaming
is reinforced, the more attention expert users devote to the information.

4.5 Data and Methods

We have set up our study of gaming in the area of education, and specifically
schools, for two reasons. First, the school system is fairly representative of other multilevel agency systems within the public sector, and it has experienced a great deal of
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performance measurement and gaming (Jacob & Levitt, 2003; O’Toole & Meier, 2011).
Second, due to real-life exposure, most individuals in a general subject pool can relate to
challenges and decision scenarios that draw on concepts such as schools, testing, and
students. While we will describe our samples in more detail further below, we want to
acknowledge upfront that we work with two samples: citizens, who we consider novices
when it comes to decision-making on the school system, and school leaders
(professionals) who serve as our proxy group of area experts. In our appendix, we show
screenshots from the online experiment. We have not attached the entire survey but share
what we think are the most relevant screens.
4.5.1 Capturing Performance Gaming
To measure gaming, we made subjects work through a fictive scenario at the end
of which they had to make choices. Participants of our survey experiment play the role of
a school administrator who has the task of deciding whether to keep students or transfer
students to another school. The fictional students are academically low-performing
students whose scores have brought down the overall school average and have created a
situation, where the school has not met the district target of a 70% overall school average.
The incentive to transfer these students to another school is that the school’s
overall average will increase, allowing the school to meet the district target. The
disincentive to transferring these academically-challenged students is that sending them
to another school will prevent them from accessing a successful reading program,
SuperStudent, which is only available at the current school (SuperStudent is a fictional
program, created for purposes of this experiment, but such programs exist in US schools).
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The dilemma of deciding whether to keep students or transfer them (and, hence, help the
school administration or the struggling students) presents the participants in this
experiment with an opportunity for gaming the system: school-average metrics can be
improved at the expense of the individual. Appendix 1.A shows two screens we used to
set up the scenario.
At the end of the scenario, participants were provided with a list of students and
their test scores, and they had to decide which students to keep or transfer (see appendix
1.C.1). Based on participants’ decisions we calculated a gaming score, which tends to be
high if students with low test scores were omitted. Our gaming variable ranges from 0 (no
gaming) to 16 (meaning complete gaming). The participants receive gaming scores
depending on the student that is transferred. For example, a student with a very low
standardized test score of 17% provides participants with a gaming score of 3, whereas a
much higher-performing student (a score of 63%) provides participants with a score of 1
if transferred (see appendix 1.C.2). Gaming points are only given to participants if the
participant transfers a student, whereas keeping a student is scored 0. Keeping a student is
not considered gaming because the actual performance of the overall school is not being
distorted. This measurement of gaming behavior is similar to the one used by Bohte and
Meier (2000) who measure gaming as the percentage of students that were exempted
from taking standardized tests.
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4.5.2 Treatments and Other Variables
As described above, participants need to decide whether they want to keep or
transfer low-performing students. Keeping students, in our fictive scenario, also means
being able to help struggling students via enrollment in a reading program called
SuperStudent. To examine whether, and to what extent, prosocial impact information
affects performance gaming, different groups of participants were subjected to different
visualizations of performance information about the success of SuperStudent before
being asked to make any decisions. The experiment employs three treatment groups and
one control group (the latter did not receive any performance information about
SuperStudent). All three treatment groups received positive feedback about the impact of
the program on students. However, the “quantitative PI” group received only quantitative
data: two tables that show performance scores for the SuperStudent school over four
years and compared to another school. The other two treatment groups received
qualitative information in the shape of testimonials as well as pictures of individuals who
were positively impacted by the program. Here, groups were differentiated based on the
race of the impacted students and stakeholders. That is, while the text was identical,
pictures and names were traditionally African American for one group (“qualitative PI
[black]”) and Caucasian for the other (“qualitative PI [white]”). All exact treatments are
featured in appendix 1.B.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups. We performed a
manipulation check for our treatments. We used three items that pick up on the perceived
social impact of the treatment (one sample item is: “The information I have reviewed
indicates that SuperStudent is benefiting students”). Correlational analysis shows that our
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three-item measure of perceived impact is – across samples of citizens and professionals
– significantly positively correlated with the PI treatment groups and negatively with the
(no PI) control group. In line with recent recommendations by Mutz, Pemantle and Pham
(2019), we – instead of presenting mostly uninformative balance tests – estimate
treatment effects with and without a set of control variables to our experimental models.
We do provide a balance table in Appendix 3 to show that the different groups were
balanced and one group did not have significantly more of one variable than another
group.
One additional variable with relevance for our hypothesis testing is school
leaders’ inexperience, which is capture via a reversed ordinal 5-point scale of work
experience. We use this measure to differentiate among professionals with more or less
work experience. A second variable that is of theoretical interest is the attention
participants devoted to the performance information they received. This variable is
measured as the time (in seconds) that subjects spent looking at the treatment screen.
Additional control variables include minority (everyone who identifies as non-white and
non-Hispanic); female (coded zero for males); age (using brackets); and liberal political
ideology (a scale where zero is labelled “conservative” and ten is labelled “liberal”).
4.5.3 Samples of Citizens and Professionals
To capture groups of novices and experts, we use samples of citizens and
professionals (school leaders) for our survey experiment, which is set up in the area of
test scores and schools. The experts (school leaders) are experts in the field of education
and should be more familiar with the roles being asked of them compared to the novice
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(general population sample). We can expect the experts to be experts because they
professionally work in their field and we expect the general population to have less
expertise as a collective because they were not randomly pulled from a professional pool.
Our sample of school leaders stands at 286 (this number is lower for some multivariate
analyses due to missing values on some of the survey questions). This group includes
principals, assistant principals, lead teachers, school counselors, program directors, and
district administrators, spanning elementary school through high school, and spanning
charter and traditional public schools. All school personnel are from the same public
school district.
To collect this data, we first received approval from our institutional review board
and the school board’s research approval committee. Being that our experiment was
completely online, we contacted school leaders via e-mail. We accomplished this by
dividing the district into its major sub-areas. We then visited schools or scoured school
web sites for publicly available e-mails. We eventually contacted every school whose
information was available, reaching a total of about 4,200 school leaders. We sent about
reminders during our survey period ranging between September 2018 and April 2019.
Like most other randomized controlled trials, our focus is with internal rather than
external validity. That is, it was important to us to recruit real-life school leaders rather
than being able to argue that this group of volunteers is representative of a specific school
district. To ensure that the school leaders, who otherwise had no personal stake in the
fictive decision scenario, feel more invested in the experiment, we offered the following
incentives: Meeting the fictive 70% target of the case scenario resulted in the receipt of
bookstore gift card for a 20% discount, while retaining students and giving them the
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opportunity to improve triggered a book donation to schools in need if a majority of
school leaders chose the latter option. (Eventually, we donated books to three schools.)
Our citizens sample stands at 758 participants. In December 2017, we recruited
subjects via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) platform that has been found to be
largely representative of population-based random samples (Coppock, 2019; Huff &
Tingley, 2015). It has also been used in public management research that focuses on
citizen attitudes and behaviors (for an overview, see Stritch et al., 2017). We paid $0.50
to each participant as well as a fee to Amazon. Participants were rewarded for
participating and not based on how they answered questions in the experiment.
To make sure that participants paid attention when filling out the survey, we used
the following two strategies. First, we constructed the survey in a way, where subjects
could only complete the sorting task by dragging and dropping each individual student
into either the “keep” and “transfer” categories. Hence, not doing anything on the
decision screen was not a viable option if one’s goal was to complete the survey and get
paid. Second, we reached out to a random sample of participants that completed the
survey with above-average speed and asked for more explanations of their decisionmaking.
We wanted most of the sample to be from North America in order to be somewhat
comparable to our school leader group. At the same time, we do not think that our model
is specific to the US or North America, which is why we find it beneficial to test our
theoretical expectations using a more global sample. Our final sample is 80% North
American and 20% international (mostly from Asia/India). Since our sample suggests
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that there was more performance gaming outside of North America, we control for this
variable in our models. Further, we interacted a North America dummy variable with the
main effects presented in this paper but find no significant differences (results not
shown). Hence, our findings for the citizen sample hold beyond North America. Table 7
shows the descriptive statistics of both our citizen sample and our professionals sample.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Citizens Sample
Mean
Std.
Range
Dev.
Gaming Score
6.72
4.61
0 – 16

Professionals Sample
Mean
Std.
Range
Dev.
4.38
4.76
0 – 16

Quantitative PI

0.25

–

0–1

0.27

–

0–1

Qualitative PI
(students
generally)
Qualitative PI
(Black students)
Attention

0.26

–

0–1

0.21

–

0–1

0.24

–

0–1

0.28

–

0–1

65.26

56.50

1.34 –
640.96

373.14

4,211.09

Minority

0.41

–

0–1

0.78

–

11.10 –
71,239.9
6
0–1

Female

0.49

–

0–1

0.78

–

0–1

Age

2.39

1.09

1–5

2.96

0.81

1–4

Liberal

6.06

2.77

0 – 10

5.67

2.44

0 – 10

North America

0.80

–

0–1

–

–

–

–

–

–

2.10

1.27

1–5

Inexperience
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The descriptive statistics for both our samples can be found in table 1. On
average, professionals spent about two minutes5 looking at the treatment, while citizens
did so for about one minute. Within the citizen sample, 41% of the individuals identified
as racial minorities as opposed to 78% in the professional sample. Roughly half of the
citizens are female, while this number among school leaders is 78%. The professionals
(46% are between 41 and 54) are on average older than the citizens (47% are between 26
and 35). Both samples seem to be fairly centrist regarding participants’ political views –
citizens scored 6.1, professionals 5.7 on an ideology scale, where ten was labelled liberal
and zero was labelled conservative. While we did not expect citizens to have any work
experience in the school system, 45% of professionals reported 21+ years of experience,
followed by 28% reporting 15-20 years of experience.
4.6 Results

Table 8 provides a test of hypotheses 1-3 about different visualizations of impact
data as well as differences between novices (citizens) and experts (school leaders)
(hypothesis 4). The table shows the effects (OLS regression coefficients) for the three
treatment groups (the control group serves as the reference) on individuals’ gaming
scores. The first two models combine the two qualitative PI groups into one, while
models three and four separate the qualitative treatment by target group (white versus
black). The table contrasts findings across samples (citizens versus professionals), and it

5

Table 1 shows the larger, unadjusted mean that, however, is driven by two extreme values.

108

accounts for a set of demographic controls, although the results remain the same with or
without control variables (results without controls are shown in appendix 2.B).

Table 8: The effect of prosocial impact treatments on performance gaming
Citizens
Professionals
Citizens
Professionals
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Quantitative PI
-0.43 (0.34)
-0.66 (0.41)
-0.43 (0.34)
-0.66 (0.41)
Qualitative PI
(combined)
Qualitative PI (white
students)
Qualitative PI
(black students)
Constant

-0.93 (0.02)

10.85 (0.00)

-0.03 (0.96)

5.83 (0.00)

-0.68 (0.14)

-0.00 (0.99)

-1.20 (0.01)

-0.06 (0.94)

10.85 (0.00)

5.84 (0.00)

N
758
263
758
263
R2
0.088
0.015
0.089
0.015
Note: p-values in parentheses (significant results marked in bold for hypothesized
effects); control group serves as reference category; control variables: Minority,
Female, Age, Liberal, North America (last one only in citizens sample); robust
standard errors.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that prosocial impact information reduces performance
gaming. We largely see evidence for this claim, as the gaming scores for all treatment
groups are lower than that of the control group (although not all coefficients are
statistically significant). Regarding types of data visualization, we find that qualitative
impact information is more influential in reducing gaming than quantitative data (model
1), which supports hypothesis 2. Further, we see in model 3 that when broken down by
groups of beneficiaries, impact information reduces gaming behavior to a larger extent if
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program beneficiaries tend to belong to a historically disadvantaged group (black versus
white students). This supports hypothesis 3. At the same time, we note a stark contrast
across our two samples. The findings that we just described only hold for the citizen but
not the school leader sample (models 2 and 4). These results are largely in line with
hypothesis 4, which emphasizes that the general model outlined in our first three
hypotheses may work for novices but not area experts. In fact, we proposed adjustments
to such a general theory when it comes to professionals, and we examine these
adjustments next.
One notable difference between novices and experts can be found in table 7. On
our scale ranging between 0 and 16, school leaders (4.4) gamed significantly less than
citizens (6.7). In essence, 47% of all school leaders and 28% of all citizens did not game
at all.
In addition to the differences documented in Tables 7 and 8, Table 9 provides
further insights into some idiosyncratic effects for the expert group. This table draws only
on the sample of school leaders, and it interacts the treatment effects with our
inexperience variable (the latter being a reversed measure of work experience). Using this
variable allows us to perform a second test of our novices-expert distinction hypothesis.
We now differentiate among more and fewer experienced experts, assuming that, if our
hypothesis holds true, experts with less experience will be more influenced by impact
information. The modelling here is otherwise similar to our strategy in Table 8. It is
noteworthy that the attention and inexperience variables were mean-centered, so that the
coefficients in the first five rows show the treatment effects when attention and
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inexperience are at their respective means. Our focus, however, is on the interaction
terms.
Table 9: Moderations of the effect of prosocial impact (school leaders)
(1)
(2)
Quantitative PI
-3.92 (0.01)
-0.81 (0.33)
Qualitative PI (white students)

-3.93 (0.09)

-0.16 (0.85)

Qualitative PI (black students)

-2.60 (0.04)

-0.33 (0.69)

Attention

0.01 (0.06)

Inexperience

0.66 (0.23)

Interactions
Quantitative x Attention

-0.01 (0.01)

Qualitative (white) x Attention

-0.01 (0.08)

Qualitative (black) x Attention

-0.01 (0.01)

Quantitative x Inexperience

-1.08 (0.10)

Qualitative (white) x Inexperience

-1.36 (0.04)

Qualitative (black) x Inexperience

-0.20 (0.76)

Constant

7.79 (0.00)

5.92 (0.00)

N
263
263
2
R
0.040
0.037
Note: p-values in parentheses (significant results marked in bold for hypothesized
effects); control group serves as reference category; control variables: Minority,
Female, Age, Liberal; robust standard errors. The Attention and Inexperience
variables were mean-centered to allow more straightforward interpretations of the
main effects.

Model 2 in Table 9 shows that, generally, impact information reduces gaming
more if experts tend to be inexperienced. While all three coefficients for the interaction
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effect show the expected negative sign, only one is statistically significant at p<0.05 and
another is just outside of the p<0.10 cut-off. What this suggests is that by and large the
same pattern we find across novices and experts also holds when differentiating among
more and less experienced experts. This is more evidence for hypothesis 4.
Model 1 in Table 9 tests an extension of our theory captured by hypothesis 5.
While experts may be less impacted by performance information, they are able to get
much out of such feedback if they choose to pay attention to it. As attention increases, we
see that the mitigating effect of all types of data visualizations on gaming behavior
becomes stronger (more negative). Two coefficients are significant at p<0.05, whereas
one is at p<0.10. While the size of the coefficients appears to be small at first glance, we
need to keep in mind that attention was operationalized as the time the treatment screen
remained open in seconds. That is, for each additional minute devoted to studying impact
information, the gaming behavior will be reduced by 0.60. This finding supports
hypothesis 5.6

4.7 Discussion

Visualizations of prosocial impact data, particularly when qualitative and
visualizing benefits for clients in need, can lead to less performance gaming. We find
that this theory holds for our general population sample. At the same time, these findings
differ for our area experts, a group whose behavior was largely unaffected by different

6

As a check, we also ran the same tests for the citizens sample, but here more exposure to
information does not yield a significant interaction effect (results shown in Appendix 2C).
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visualizations of prosocial impact data. When dividing that group of school leaders by
work experience, the same general pattern emerged: Experienced leaders are significantly
less likely to be swayed by performance data than less experienced leaders. More
descriptively, school leaders also engaged much less in gaming behavior than citizens.
Overall, we documented stark contrasts between novices and experts.
We explain novice-expert differences due to socialization on the one hand, and a
differential knowledge base on the other (Manaf et al., 2018; Moyson et al., 2018; Salas
et al., 2010). Expert opinions may be much firmer than those of novices. Empiricallygrounded experience – and values developed through experience – have shaped experts’
mindsets over a long period of time, which is why we are not surprised that school
leaders gamed much less than our citizen group. The former is aware that gaming the
system, while widely practiced, is not normatively desired. The fact there was less
gaming among experts is likely attributable to an organizational culture effect, which we
could not account for since all expert participants came from the same school district. It is
possible the participants from the school district sample are familiar with the scenario and
are less susceptible to gaming because of experience with how to deal with such
scenarios. Additionally, experts have often been exposed to a host of relevant information
that can be transferred across similar decision situations. Experts may be more prone than
novices to give a socially desirable response when it comes to decision dilemmas,
possibly shaped by the norms of their profession. Also, the behavior of experts may be
shaped by their professional socialization and what they deem acceptable as a collective.
This type of socialization base might not be as developed in novices. Hence, the marginal
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impact of one more piece of information (such as in our feedback treatments) is not likely
to be pivotal in changing decision outcomes or routine behaviors.
One would expect that public values such as diversity and social equity, which are
largely featured among the current generation of public managers (Hill & Lynn, 2015),
affect professionals’ behaviors – instead, school leaders did not alter their decision when
confronted with performance information showing potential improvements for African
American stakeholders. Specifically, since most of the school leaders in our sample
belong to a minority group themselves, we would suspect to see a more responsiveness
towards minority students (Meier, 2019). One explanation certainly is the fact that a fair
number of leaders in our sample are white Hispanics as opposed to African Americans.
But even when interacting the ‘qualitative PI treatment targeted towards black students’
with black school leaders, we do not see any significant effects (results shown in
Appendix 2D).
Our findings also show that experts can get a great deal out of performance data if
they choose to pay attention to a new information tidbit. This finding is not limited to
qualitative feedback, as it was for the citizen sample, but quantitative data as well.
Experts are certainly equipped to make sense of such information, but we will need more
research into the factors that make them pay attention in the first place. A second avenue
for future research is building a body of literature on the effects of data framing and
visualization on the dysfunctional uses of performance information, which tend to be
mostly neglected in experimental public management research. To follow the route of
scholarship on purposeful data use (e.g., Moynihan et al. 2017; Webeck & NicholsonCrotty, 2019), work on performance gaming could benefit from adopting some of the
114

experimental methods employed in research on unethical behavior (Bellé & Cantarelli,
2017a; Hilbig & Hessler 2013).
We recognize that conducting a survey experiment certainly constitutes a
limitation. A major concern with such experiments is that text vignettes may not be
powerful enough to invoke behavioral or even attitudinal effects. We addressed the issue
by using a full case scenario that subjects had to work through before making a decision,
rather than simply exposure to one vignette description. We also found significant
differences across treatment and control groups, suggesting that our scenarios were
successful in triggering varying responses. While we agree that laboratory experiments
have certain advantages over survey experiments, we also want to acknowledge that it
becomes almost impossible to recruit a sample of 200+ school leaders to participate in a
lab study, often leaving researchers with student samples in such settings. We also
acknowledge the limitations of using the citizen sample as a proxy measure for novices.
Actual novices would be assistant teachers, but the difficulty in gathering a large sample
of assistant teachers is similar to that of school leaders. The citizen sample then served as
an appropriate proxy measure.
4.8 Conclusion

Using samples of citizens and school leaders, the paper documents the effects of
prosocial impact information on performance gaming, and it explores important expertnovice differences. In line with a general theory, we find that impact information reduces
gaming among novices if information is qualitative in nature and particularly visualizes
benefits for clients in need. However, these findings cannot be confirmed for our group of
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experts, suggesting that this group is less prone to differently manipulated information
cues. This pattern holds when we compare experts with more or less work experience.
Those with more experience are less susceptible to impact information, no matter the type
of visualization. At the same time, impact information is influential if it can grab experts’
attention, and this includes qualitative as well as quantitative feedback.
A first contribution that our paper makes is to a broader theory of performance
information use. While the number of studies on responses from citizens and decisionmakers is still increasing (for an overview, see James and Olsen 2017; Moynihan et al.
2017), only very few studies tested the same model on different populations
simultaneously. We think that such testing is paramount for broader theory-building
because it helps distinguishing the elements of our models that are transferrable across, or
unique to, populations such as managers, politicians, citizens, clients, and other
stakeholders. Specifically, our findings suggest being careful with generalizations across
samples. Effects largely varied between citizens and professionals (school leaders),
indicating that extrapolating from one group to the other may be a slippery slope when it
comes to responses to performance data. While we find it plausible that certain effects
and responses may mirror each other across populations, we propose that taken-forgranted assumptions about their transferability ought to be tested.
For practice, the main conclusion we draw is that performance information needs
to be tailored to the needs of different user groups. For novices, information was most
influential when qualitative and when impact on specific client groups was emphasized.
With experts, the challenge is to direct this group’s attention to a new information; and
strategies to accomplish this certainly require additional research. However, once experts
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pay attention to information, both qualitative and quantitative visualizations are similarly
impactful.
Another theoretical contribution is in the area of prosociality and unethical
behavior. Interestingly, prior work documented mixed findings where, in some cases,
prosociality led to more and in others to less unethical behavior (Bellé & Cantarelli,
2017b; Bolino & Grant, 2016; Olsen et al., 2018). Previous work has argued that
decision-makers exposed to prosocial impact information may engage in unethical
behaviors if such behaviors benefit clients. Our study provides a reversed test of this
argument. We told subjects that gaming (meeting the school target) will harm clients
(individual students): So, in a setting in which it is clear that unethical behavior has direct
negative consequences for others, prosocial treatments will yield less unethical behavior.
A final contribution is to the literature on performance gaming. A great deal of
gaming research in public administration draws on principal-agent assumptions and
considers self-interest as the main motive behind actions in the workplace. Hence,
research is concerned with accountability systems, incentive structures, and system
configurations. Our take is different, in that we start from a prosocial perspective: if we
are aware of the direct impact of our work on others, then maximizing this impact can
become a more instructive motive than maximizing personal gains at the expense of
others. While different visualizations of impact data may also call for different system
configurations, the centerpiece of this perspective is leveraging – and strengthening –
individuals’ altruism, empathy, and public values.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this section, I will bring together my three essays for a synthesized crossanalysis. In the literature essay that introduces my dissertation, I provide an explanation
for other avenues for further research, specifically in the realm of experimental studies,
where we can establish stronger causal links between gaming behavior and hypothesized
factors. I activate some of my proposed ideas that I presented in the literature review, by
examining other-oriented constructs, such as mission-orientation (in the observational
study) and prosocial impact information (in the experimental study). Both empirical
studies and the literature review examine performance gaming as the variable of interest
and the influence of other-oriented constructs as antecedents that reduce performance
gaming. The theoretical contribution is the importance of other-oriented constructs as
antecedents in reducing performance gaming. For the practical implications for public
management, other-oriented constructs can provide mechanisms for aiding public
managers in reducing gaming and improve decision-making.
5.1 Summary of Conclusion

In public organizations, performance systems underscore the importance of
democratic accountability and government responsiveness to the public interest (Van
Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008). But performance systems bring with them dysfunctional
behavior, such as performance gaming, where individuals and organizations seek to
undermine organizational goals by manipulating performance output in perverse ways.
Principal-agent theory is the traditional explanation for performance information use
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory explains that the principal seeks to control the
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agent via performance information. The theory rests on the idea that both the principal
and agent are self-interested actors and are motivated to act by this self-interest.
This dissertation supports an expanded explanation to the principal-agent theory
(Moynihan et al., 2012; Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010) by
exploring other-oriented constructs and how these shape the dysfunctional use of
information. Other-oriented constructs include such concepts as prosociality, public
service motivation, mission-orientation, and citizenship behavior (Korsgaard et al., 1996).
In my systematic review (my first essay of this dissertation), I found that individual and
behavioral traits have been studied extensively in fields outside of public administration
as explanations for unethicality and performance gaming. I tested these theories by
examining factors embedded in other-oriented constructs, such as mission-orientation (in
the observational study) and prosocial impact information (in the experimental study). I
contributed to building a theory of performance gaming based on individual and
behavioral traits, specifically other-oriented constructs. To the practical implications for
public management, both studies ultimately address concerns of dysfunctional uses of
performance information and ways public managers can mitigate the consequences of
these dysfunctions. This dissertation has implications for the citizens that public
managers serve because some communities (specifically historically disadvantaged
groups) are affected much more by performance gaming than other groups. This chapter
will provide conclusive remarks for each of my three essays. Then, I will provide a
synthesized analysis and conclusion, making a summative argument that other-oriented
constructs can form a basis for understanding dysfunctional uses of information.
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5.2 Conclusion of Essay 1: Systematic Review

In the study of performance gaming, public administration has mainly focused on
antecedents that are part of the performance system itself. These include studies that have
examined the effects of system design flaws, targets, rankings, and incentives (Bevan &
Hood, 2006; Courty & Marschke, 2007). In other social science fields, the focus has
mainly been on individual and behavioral traits, such as moral identity and cognitive
dissonance (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Welsh & Ordonez, 2014). The primary method in these
other fields has been an experimental approach and the unit of analysis has been graduate
students and citizens (Aquino et al., 2009). Public administration can draw lessons from
these fields by looking outside of the organizational and system variables and focusing on
individual and behavioral traits.
In my systematic literature review, I provided hypotheses based on my findings.
The hypotheses and propositions included the need for an other-oriented theory of
performance gaming, more experimental research, and the use of interactive variables.
The hypotheses point to the developing a theory for explaining performance gaming that
is centered on other-oriented constructs. While scholars studying private organizations
may see dysfunctional use of performance information as a function of self-interest, in
public organizations there is much research that points to public servants having a
predisposition toward serving the public (Perry, 1996). This supports the view that otheroriented constructs may be particularly important to understanding performance gaming
in the public sector. I also explained that public administration can benefit through more
experimental research, which provide stronger arguments for causality. And the field can
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benefit from stronger causal models that feature the use of interactive variables. In the
other social science disciplines, much of the research on unethical behavior has involved
experimental research and the use of interactive variables in creating more explicit
models of unethicality (Bateson et al., 2006; Mazar et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2010).
In many ways, this dissertation is a response to the findings and gaps found in the
systematic review. The need for a strong theory of performance gaming was partially
accomplished in this dissertation through the use of other-oriented constructs as building
blocks for a theory of performance gaming. This dissertation also uses an experimental
method in one of the major studies, which is a direct response to findings in my
systematic review that there is a lack of experimental research in performance gaming.
While laboratory tests may not always be practical for studying public managers, quasiexperimental studies and natural experiments may be suitable. Finally, this dissertation
responds to the need for the use of interactive variables. It was in the interactive variable
of experience and prosociality and also prosociality and attention where I made
interesting findings. These interaction variables provided explanation for managerial
performance gaming in my experimental study. Other-oriented constructs themselves
may not hold viable explanation for behavior. This is because a single variable is seldom
the lone predictor of outcomes in social science. There is a lot to be gained by the use of
more sophisticated models that include interacting variables. The systematic review was a
necessary guide for this dissertation as it pointed to the gaps in the performance gaming
literature.
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5.3 Conclusion of Essay 2: Effort Substitution

In my second essay for this dissertation, I studied effort substitution, a specific
type of performance gaming where effort is substituted or shifted toward rewarded
indicators at the expense of unrewarded ones. Using a five-year panel data of 64 high
schools, I found that task demands can predict effort substitution. When rewarded and
unrewarded indicators capture different dimensions of performance, there is strong
support for the mitigating effect of mission orientation on performance gaming. The
conclusion is that public managers are faced with real decisions when rewards and
unrewarded indicators are not linked, so there are real decisions to make. A purposedriven organization will have a mitigating effect on performance gaming in such
situations because managers will look for purpose to guide decision-making.
This paper contributes to building a theory of performance gaming that includes
other-oriented constructs as antecedents. In my paper on effort substitution, the focus is
on the significance of organizations that are oriented toward their purposefullyestablished missions. While all organizations have missions, not all missions are
purposefully-driven to serve the public and not all organizations are oriented toward their
mission (Brewster & Cerdin, 2018; Knies & Leisink, 2018). In the case of public
organizations, a purposefully-established mission is aimed at serving the public interest
(or in some cases, specific target groups within the public sphere). This paper connects to
the theme of my dissertation on the significance of other-oriented constructs but uses
public organizations as the unit of analysis. It underscores the importance of
organizational variables shaping the behavior of public managers. This is consistent with
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the overall performance management literature that finds managerial behavior is shaped
by organizational variables (Hood, 2012; Kettl, 1997; Moynihan & Pandey, 2010).
5.4 Conclusion of Essay 3: Prosocial Impact

I studied the effect of prosocial impact on cream skimming, a type of gaming
where undesirable clients are excluded from service provision in order to improve
performance output. Prosocial impact is an other-oriented construct that describes the
experience individuals have from helping others (Bolino & Grant, 2016). I conducted
two experimental studies, one using public managers and a second study using a general
population sample. In this randomized experimental study, participants were placed into
three experimental groups with different visualizations of prosocial impact data (one
group received a placebo with no impact data). I found that prosocial impact was less
influential on public managers than on the general population sample. Prosocial impact is
more influential when public managers are less experienced or give more attention to
performance data. The conclusion from this experimental study is that prosociality is
influential in explaining performance gaming, but this effect depends on the user. For
public managers who are more experienced, there is less reliance on performance data to
guide decision-making and thus prosociality will have less of a mitigating effect on
performance gaming. For public managers who give less attention to performance data,
there will also be less reliance on this information to influence decision-making. For
public managers, attention to data and experience are important intervening variables in
terms of prosocial impact’s effect.
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My third essay also contributes to building a theory of performance gaming
centered on other-oriented constructs. The study shows that other-oriented factors can
explain organizational behavior rather than purely economic ones that are based on selfinterest. There is also the importance of performance information itself as an antecedent
of performance gaming. Different visualizations of data are processed differently and
when these data are perceived to be prosocial, they can greatly influence how data are
used in dysfunctional ways. I have a strong case that other-oriented constructs can
explain performance gaming. In the following section, I will synthesize all three essays to
make this case.
5.5 Synthesized Conclusion

The problem this dissertation addresses is the issue of why performance gaming
occurs and ways to minimize it. I took a deductive approach by first theorizing on an
alternative explanation for principal-agent theory, the traditional theory of public
management. My theoretical explanation is based on other-oriented constructs that are
added to agency theory. These other-oriented constructs are those concepts that describe
how individuals help others. Other-oriented constructs are not a replacement for the
principal-agent theory and do not equate to stating agency theory is a completely baseless
one. Other-oriented constructs provide a different perspective for understanding how
performance information is used. Though I am not the first to portend to this alternative
theory (see Moynihan et al., 2012), I make the novel contribution of using this theory as a
building block for understanding performance gaming. This theoretical building block is
especially useful for understanding performance gaming in the context of public
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organizations. This is because public administration has a long tradition of arguing that
public servants have a disposition toward public service (Houston, 2000; Moynihan &
Pandey, 2007; Perry & Wise, 1990). My theoretical argument and empirical findings are
consistent with this tradition. Other-oriented constructs are useful for explaining
organizational behavior, especially for public organizations because of the predisposition
of public servants to serve the public. But my arguments are also novel because I take a
behavioral perspective in studying performance information use. Rather than a systems
approach to studying the dysfunctional uses of performance information, the behavioral
perspective looks at the human side of motivations for organizational behavior. To make
this more lucid, this dissertation's overarching finding is that the willingness to game
performance systems can be mitigated through organizations being other-oriented. That is
to say, organizations can focus on traits that put others first, such as aligning to their
mission and being prosocial. These are traits that have been heavily studied as mitigating
factors of performance gaming in other social science fields. And public administration
can benefit by taking this route.
For public management practice, I highlighted the fact that managers matter in
performance systems, which is consistent with the public management literature (Behn,
1995; Ingraham et al., 2003; Moynihan & Pandey, 2004). I contribute to the discussion
on ways in which public managers can reduce dysfunctional uses of performance
information through prosocial and mission-driven mechanisms. Most importantly, my
dissertation contributes to a discussion on how dysfunctional uses of performance
information affect public service. The fact that my research had mixed findings on the
role historically disadvantaged groups play in dysfunctional uses of information warrants
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a discussion here and further research. In this section, I synthesize my research to make
the case for other-oriented constructs as antecedents of performance gaming. I conclude
this section with my overall theoretical and practical contributions and why my findings
matter for public service.
5.5.1 Other-Oriented Constructs: Toward a Theory of Performance Gaming
This dissertation studies the effects of prosociality and mission-orientation as
other oriented constructs and builds toward a theory of performance gaming based on
these other-oriented constructs. Such constructs describe individuals’ propensity to help
others. And they enhance the principal-agent theory that has traditionally explained how
agents (public managers) behave toward principals (elected officials) and the role of
performance information in this relationship. The traditional agency theory states that
performance information is the mechanism by which principals control agents (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). In performance systems, agents report information to principals who
determine whether the agents are meeting the goals and executing policies set forth by
principals. In this relationship, agents (as well as principals) are motivated by selfinterest, which has been used to explain why agents use performance information. In
public administration, some scholars have examined the role of altruistic motivations to
explain why performance information is used in purposeful ways (Moynihan, et al.,
2012). Previous research has implied there is an alternative explanation of agency theory
(Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). My dissertation adds to this
alternative view of agency theory, but tests the theory on performance gaming, a
dysfunctional use of performance information. Also, my dissertation tests this theory in
the context of public organizations. I find support for other-oriented constructs (mission
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orientation and prosociality) as explanations for dysfunctional behavior in public
organization. For mission-orientation, the argument is based on an organizational
perspective and for prosociality, the argument is supported in an individual context.
Mission orientation is the other-oriented construct that is associated with reducing
performance gaming for organizations. While all organizations have a mission, I make a
distinction to the type of mission orientation I study in this dissertation. In private
organizations, an organization’s mission is usually tied to profits or expanding the
organization’s influence. This is a mission based on organizational self-interest. For
public organizations, the mission is usually tied to serving the public interest or a social
cause. This latter concept of mission is what comprises the mission orientation that I
study in this dissertation. This is what makes mission orientation an other-oriented
construct. It is difficult to measure the degree to which organizations rely on their
mission, but most studies that have examined the effects of missions on organizational
behavior have used mission statements. In this dissertation, I use mission statements of
public organizations to measure mission orientation, as well as specific types of missiondriven organizations (charter schools). Organizations with missions that emphasize
specific groups or special purposes are differentiated from organizations with general
missions. So, my dissertation establishes the importance of mission orientation as an
other-oriented construct for organizations. Through my five-year longitudinal study, my
dissertation also provides empirical support for mission orientation as an other-oriented
predictor of performance gaming. Although, my findings were mixed for mission
orientation as a direct effect on performance gaming, mission orientation is more
profound as a predictor under specific conditions in the performance system. For
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example, mission orientation predicts performance gaming when unrewarded and
rewarded indicators are not conceptually linked. So, organizations with a strong mission
orientation can expect to reduce gaming behavior. But more importantly, there is
evidence toward a strong theory of performance gaming that is based on organizations
that are other-oriented.
From the individual perspective, I study prosocial impact as an other-oriented
construct that reduces performance gaming. Prosocial impact occurs when individuals
experience others benefiting from their work. This dissertation examines prosocial impact
framed through different visualizations of performance information. The argument that
prosocial impact can have benefits for performance systems is supported by the literature
in prosociality (Bolino & Grant, 2016). Individuals can become more motivated for work
and they can improve their performance because of prosocial factors. Like mission
orientation, prosociality fits within the tradition of public administration scholarship that
finds public servants are predisposed toward service to the public. But prosociality is a
broader term because it encompasses not just serving the public but anyone other than
self (Esteve, Urbig, van Witteloostuijn, & Boyne, 2016; Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise,
2010). Prosociality can include helping fellow co-workers, supervisors, or even
competing agencies. By framing prosocial impact within the performance information
itself and also measuring prosocial impact as individuals’ perceptions, I was able to
highlight nuances in prosociality. Prosocial impact was a significant predictor when it
was a intervening variable, such as with the public manager sample where experience and
time intervened with prosocial impact. From my experimental study, public managers
differ from the general population in how they process prosocial impact information.
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Prosocial impact information that is qualitative and highlights historically disadvantaged
groups (such as African Americans) was more impactful for the general population than
for public managers. From this dissertation, prosociality, as an other-oriented construct,
may be different for different groups. Public managers may be less influenced by
prosocial impact information when it comes to performance gaming, but this can be due
to the visualization of the information itself. Public managers may not be affected by
visualization cues in the same way as the general population.
To conclude this section, I have evidence toward a theory of performance gaming
that is based on other-oriented constructs. These constructs describe how organizations
and individuals are disposed toward helping others. From the organizational perspective,
there is mission orientation, which describes organizations that are aligned to a specific
purpose in service to others. From the individual perspective, there is prosocial impact,
where individuals experience how their work benefits others. While my empirical studies
provide mixed support for direct effects of other-oriented constructs in the public
management sector, there are nuances that my research has uncovered. For example,
when other-oriented constructs work through intervening variables, their effect is
significant. In the case of mission orientation, when unrewarded and rewarded indicators
are conceptually linked, mission orientation has a significant effect on performance
gaming. This dissertation establishes a concrete building block for a theory of
performance gaming where other-oriented constructs mitigate performance gaming. In
the next section, I describe this theoretical contribution among others as well as the
significance for public management practice.
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5.5.2 Contributions to theory and practice
This dissertation makes a contribution to management theory in the area of
performance management by researching performance gaming. I provide a building block
for a theory of performance gaming that highlights other-oriented constructs as factors
that reduce gaming. This dissertation also makes a contribution to management practice
with implications for managerial decision-making and improving organizational
effectiveness. Although I studied public organizations in this dissertation, I made efforts
for a cross-disciplinary connection through my systematic review. Using lessons from
this review, I expand on some of the research taking place in these other disciplines, with
emphasis on human motivational constructs that can explain dysfunctional behavior.
Finally, for the public service, this dissertation has practical significance because it leads
to a discussion of improving service delivery, especially among historically
disadvantaged groups, which are severely affected by performance gaming. In this
section, I discuss these points in more detail.
First, performance management does not have a specific theory that explains why
performance gaming occurs. To understand the behavior of public managers in a
performance system, our field has relied on the concept of self-interest as explained in
principal-agent theory. To explain organizational behavior in performance systems, we
have often studied system norms and cultures that explain why firms behave the way
they do (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Courty & Marschke, 2007; de Brujin, 2002). In my
dissertation, using an alternative explanation of principal-agent theory, in line with other
studies in performance management (Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Moynihan et al., 2012), I
have turned to other-oriented constructs. These constructs rely on altruistic motivations to
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explain behavior. Also, the role of behavioral and human motivational variables is
encouraged by the other social science disciplines (Ayal et al., 2015; Barkan, et al.,
2012). In these disciplines, self-image and moral justification are studied as antecedents
of dysfunctional behavior. Therefore, my dissertation contributes to the literature by
explaining performance gaming through the prism of these other-oriented constructs.
Mission orientation and prosocial impact do affect managerial attitudes toward
performance gaming. For example, when faced with conceptually different dimensions of
performance, public managers will be more susceptible to mission orientation and depend
more on their purpose and mission in making decisions. Managers can use mission
statements and moral reminders as cues for guiding their organizations toward the
mission.
Second, for management practice, my dissertation contributes to approaches for
management that can improve decision-making and organizational effectiveness. Public
managers are faced with tough choices and extreme pressures in performance systems.
Under these conditions, managers might be tempted to cut corners or fudge performance
numbers and engage in other dysfunctional behavior. However, managers that turn to
their organization’s mission or are reminded of that purpose, may depend more on
altruistic motivations that mitigate a desire to undermine their organization’s goal. So,
one recommendation for practice is that organizations remind individuals of their purpose
and mission and ensure that functions are aligned to these purposes. This can include
managers using moral cues (goals and purpose charts displayed in the work
environment), mission statement emphasis, and meetings with employees that emphasize
the organization’s purpose. Also, for decision-making and improved effectiveness,
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managers can spend more time on performance information and ensure that more
information is prosocial. This can lead to better decision-making and thus a more
effective organization. In sum, public organizations can become more effective when
they can connect managers to these altruistic factors – the organization’s purpose and to
spend more time on the prosocial impact of information.
Third, my dissertation encourages a discussion on performance gaming and its
effect on the general public. This connection to public service is a primary reason why
this dissertation is unique to public organizations. In the public sector, performance
gaming not only makes organizations ineffective because it undermines organizational
goals, but it also harms the particular group that the public organization serves (not to
mention it undermines public trust and democratic values). Although the public as a
whole is harmed, certain groups become doubly disadvantaged as a result of
dysfunctional behaviors. In my dissertation, I made the connection between task demands
and effort substitution. From a policy perspective, task demands in the public sector are
associated with low-income individuals, high-crime areas, people with severe disabilities,
and racial and ethnic groups, such as Blacks or Hispanics. This translates to these groups
being the most common recipients of performance gaming’s negative effects. In my
experimental study, prosocial impact information is more influential in reducing
performance gaming when beneficiaries are from disadvantaged groups (Black students).
However, this is only true for the general population sample. There is no effect for public
managers. The discussion here is that public managers and the general public may
perceive groups differently. While this dissertation does not uncover the reasons for the
difference, it opens up a conversation on how the public may perceive these groups
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differently. The role that particular groups play in performance gaming is still left
unanswered. But this is an important avenue for further research.
In conclusion, my dissertation establishes the importance of other-oriented
constructs in understanding performance gaming. Prosociality and mission orientation are
just two of these constructs studied here. But there are moderating variables, such as
attention to information and managerial experience. Individual traits play an important
role in dysfunctional behavior as studied in other disciplines. My dissertation brings these
specific traits to the forefront of public administration research in performance gaming.
Public managers can benefit from this research by creating organizations that are more
purpose-driven or aligned with existing missions. They can give more attention to
information that is prosocial. For public service, performance gaming is a serious
consequence of performance systems that can harm the general public in how they
receive government services. We still do not know to what extent particular groups are
harmed or helped by other-oriented constructs as part of the performance gaming model
presented in this dissertation. However, we do know that historically disadvantaged
groups are often doubly disadvantaged by performance gaming and so future research
should examine this dynamic. As research on performance gaming grows, it is my hope
that we can study more individual traits and build toward a specific theory of
performance gaming.
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Appendix 1.B: Treatments
No PI group (control)
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Quantitative PI group
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Qualitative PI group
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Qualitative Black PI group
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Appendix 1.C.1: Task – Front end (capturing dependent variable)
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Appendix 1.C.2: Task – Back end (gaming score sheet)
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Appendix 2: Supplementary Analysis
The tables in Appendix 2 are supplementary analyses for the experimental study in Essay
3 of this dissertation. Below is an explanation of each table.
Table 10 shows the treatment-demographic correlation. The table shows that the different
groups were balanced and one group did not have significantly more of one variable than
another group.
Table 10. Appendix 2.A: Treatment-demographics correlations
Citizen Sample
School Leader Sample
No PI Quant Qual PI Qual PI No PI Quant Qual PI Qual PI
PI
(White) (Black)
PI
(White) (Black)
Minority
0.04
-0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.04
-0.05
0.02
-0.01
Female
0.01
0.06
0.01
-0.07^ -0.03
-0.01
0.06
-0.03
Age
-0.03
-0.05
0.05
0.02
0.02
-0.07
0.04
0.02
Liberal
0.02
0.01
-0.07^
0.03
0.02
-0.03
0.04
-0.02
Note: ^ p<0.10

Table 11 shows the effect of prosocial impact treatment across treatment groups without
control variables.
Table 11. Appendix 2.B: The effect of prosocial impact (without controls)
Citizens
Professionals
Citizens
Professionals
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Quantitative PI
-0.43 (0.35)
-0.45 (0.58)
-0.43 (0.35)
-0.45 (0.58)
Qualitative PI
(combined)
Qualitative PI (white
students)
Qualitative PI
(black students)
Constant

-0.96 (0.02)

7.32 (0.00)

-0.09 (0.90)

4.55 (0.00)

-0.76 (0.11)

-0.12 (0.88)

-1.18 (0.01)

-0.07 (0.93)

7.32 (0.00)

4.55 (0.00)

N
758
286
758
263
R2
0.008
0.001
0.008
0.001
Note: p-values in parentheses (significant results marked in bold for hypothesized
effects); control group serves as reference category; robust standard errors.
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Table 12 shows the attention interaction for the novice (general population) sample.

Table 12. Appendix 2.C: Does Attention Matter?
Quantitative PI

(1)
-0.054 (0.937)

(2)
0.039 (0.954)

Qualitative PI (white students)

-0.657 (0.347)

-0.675 (0.314)

Qualitative PI (black students)

-1.003 (0.714)

-1.036 (0.129)

Attention

0.010 (0.275)

-0.005 (0.954)

Minority (Nonwhite)

0.632 (0.121)

Female

-1.085 (0.002)**

Age

-0.395 (0.019)*

Liberal

-0.188 (0.002)**

North American

-1.273 (0.002)**

Interactions
Quantitative x Attention

-0.004 (0.711)

-0.005 (0.626)

Qualitative (white) x Attention

0.003 (0.776)

-0.002 (0.830)

Qualitative (black) x Attention

0.001 (0.927)

-0.000 (0.973)

Constant

7.75** (0.00)

10.899** (0.000)

N
758
758
2
R
0.021
0.0
Notes: ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.05; p-values in parentheses (significant results marked in
bold for hypothesized effects); control group serves as reference category; control
variables: Minority, Female, Age, Liberal; robust standard errors. The Attention
variable was mean-centered to allow more straightforward interpretations of the main
effects.
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Table 13 shows the effect when administrators were of the same race as students.
Table 13. Appendix 2.D: Student-Administrator Match Based on Race
(1)
(2)
Quantitative PI
-0.790 (0.371)
-0789 (0.376)
Qualitative PI (white students)

0.215 (0.817)

0.321 (0.736)

Qualitative PI (black students)

0.080 (0.929)

-0.149 (0.868)

Black Admin (incl. Black Hispanic)

0.522 (0.371)

0.719 (0.669)

Female

-0.852 (0.260)

Age

-0.144 (0.684)

Liberal

-0.157 (0.216)

Interactions
Quantitative x Black Admin.

-0.862 (0.691)

0.670 (0.759)

Qualitative (white) x Black Admin.

-1.546 (0.495)

-1.565 (0.490)

Qualitative (black) x Black Admin.

0.134 (0.952)

0.454 (0.839)

Constant

4.264** (0.00)

6.267** (0.000)

N
272
263
R2
0.010
0.022
Notes: ** p < 0.1, * p < 0.05; p-values in parentheses (significant results marked in
bold for hypothesized effects); control group serves as reference category; control
variables: Female, Age, Liberal; robust standard errors.
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Appendix 3: OLS Regression Diagnostics for Essay 2 – Effort Substitution
Appendix 3 shows diagnostic tests for the OLS Regression used in Essay 2, the study on
effort substitution. The first test shown in Figure 5 is the test for normality of the
residuals using the Kernel density test. The estimate shows normality of the residuals.
Figure 4: Kernel Density Plot of Residuals for Effort Substitution
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Tables 14 and 15 show the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity. Since p<0.05, I rejected the null
hypothesis and conclude there is a possibility of heteroscedasticity, which means there is an issue. To address this issue, I use
robust standard errors in the main regression tables. I clustered standard errors for schools. This is explained in the footnote on
page 72. Using robust standard errors also addresses the issue of independence of the residuals.

Table 14: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity Grad Gaming
Graduation Gaming

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Charter School
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources
_cons

-0.0046307
0.0069763
0.0482808
0.0652211
-0.0000689
-0.0291445
-0.1580293
-0.1352805
1.211822

0.0033616
0.0025912
0.1973599
0.0650528
0.0000758
0.1502758
0.189
0.1111826
1.032491

-1.38
2.69
0.24
1
-0.91
-0.19
-0.84
-1.22
1.17

0.17
0.008
0.807
0.317
0.364
0.846
0.404
0.225
0.242

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of gradgame
chi2(1)
= 4.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.0263
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[95% Conf.
-0.0112502
0.0018738
-0.3403536
-0.0628786
-0.0002181
-0.3250624
-0.5302015
-0.3542174
-0.8213242

Interval]
0.0019889
0.0120788
0.4369151
0.1933207
0.0000803
0.2667734
0.214143
0.0836565
3.244969

Table 15: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity Acc. Gaming
Acceleration Gaming
Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Charter School
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources
_cons

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

0.0054554
0.01058
-1.317184
0.1176754
-0.0002156
0.0987069
-0.2072595
-0.150189
0.5973752

0.0047665
0.0036827
0.2800452
0.0924622
0.0001076
0.2136266
0.2686864
0.1578144
1.467568

1.14
2.87
-4.7
1.27
-2
0.46
-0.77
-0.95
0.41

0.253
0.004
0
0.204
0.046
0.644
0.441
0.342
0.684

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of gradgame
chi2(1)
= 4.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.0263
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[95% Conf.
-0.0039303
0.0033283
-1.868629
-0.0643946
-0.0004276
-0.3219517
-0.736338
-0.4609461
-2.292456

Interval]
0.0148412
0.0178317
-0.7657387
0.2997454
-3.70E-06
0.5193655
0.3218191
0.1605681
3.487207

Table 16 through Table 19 show robust regression for the two gaming measures (graduation gaming and acceleration gaming).
For each gaming measure, there are two tables (one for each mission measure: charter and mission specificity). The robust
regression tables, whose estimator is not based on the OLS assumptions, show that the findings are about the same as with the
OLS regression.
Table 16: Graduation Gaming Model 1: Charter School
Number of obs = 268
F( 12, 255) =
6.54
Prob > F =
0.00

Robust Regression

Graduation Gaming

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Charter School
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources

-0.0112415
0.0061272
-0.1634876
0.0010217
-0.0001272
-0.0164428
-0.1670555
-0.0187620

0.002029
0.00147
0.102819
0.042371
3.86E-05
0.089063
0.108199
0.066004

-5.54
4.17
-1.59
0.02
-3.30
-0.18
-1.54
-0.28

0.000
0.000
0.113
0.981
0.001
0.854
0.124
0.776

-0.0152373
0.0032328
-0.3659692
-0.0824207
-0.0002032
-0.191836
-0.3801323
-0.1487436

-0.00725
0.009022
0.038994
0.084464
-5.1E-05
0.15895
0.046021
0.11122

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.1244535
-0.0163146
0.1020392
0.0209867

0.115281
0.111484
0.112302
0.11854

1.08
-0.15
0.91
0.18

0.281
0.884
0.364
0.860

-0.1025706
-0.2358605
-0.1191185
-0.2124547

0.351478
0.203231
0.323197
0.254428

_cons

1.5781190

0.633516

2.49

0.013

0.33052900

2.825709
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[95% Conf. Interval]

Table 17: Graduation Gaming Model 2: Mission Specificity
Number of obs = 268
F( 12, 255) =
6.54
Prob > F =
0.00

Robust Regression

Graduation Gaming

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Mission Specificity
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources

-0.0112415
0.0061272
-0.1634876
0.0010217
-0.0001272
-0.0164428
-0.1670555
-0.0187620

0.002029
0.001470
0.102819
0.042371
0.000039
0.089063
0.108199
0.066004

-5.54
4.17
-1.59
0.02
-3.3
-0.18
-1.54
-0.28

0.000
0.000
0.113
0.981
0.001
0.854
0.124
0.776

-0.015237
0.003233
-0.365969
-0.082421
-0.000203
-0.191836
-0.380132
-0.148744

-0.00725
0.00902
0.03899
0.08446
-0.00005
0.15895
0.04602
0.11122

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.1244535
-0.0163146
0.1020392
0.0209867

0.115281
0.1114836
0.1123021
0.1185397

1.08
-0.15
0.91
0.18

0.281
0.884
0.364
0.860

-0.1025706
-0.2358605
-0.1191185
-0.2124547

0.3514776
0.2032313
0.3231970
0.2544281

_cons

1.5781190

0.633516

2.49

0.013

0.33052900

2.8257090
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[95% Conf. Interval]

Table 18: Acceleration Gaming Model 1: Charter School
Number of obs = 268
F( 12, 255) = 19.72
Prob > F =
0.00

Robust Regression

Graduation Gaming

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Charter School
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources

0.009605
0.005110
-1.467240
0.084767
-0.000263
0.254891
-0.217056
-0.007897

0.0024851
0.0018765
0.143559
0.0514751
0.0000552
0.1096224
0.1377807
0.0811153

3.87
2.72
-10.22
1.65
-4.76
2.33
-1.58
-0.1

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.02
0.12
0.92

0.004711
0.001414
1.749952
0.016604
0.000371
0.03901
0.488389
0.167638

0.014499
0.008805
-1.18453
0.186137
-0.00015
0.470771
0.054277
0.151845

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.207797
0.143415
0.265177
0.262470

0.1410714
0.1363051
0.1361824
0.1439798

1.47
1.05
1.95
1.82

0.14
0.29
0.05
0.07

-0.07002
0.125012
0.003008
0.021071

0.485611
0.411842
0.533363
0.546011

_cons

-0.593210

0.7861901

-0.75

0.45

2.141463

0.9550424
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[95% Conf. Interval]

Table 19: Acceleration Gaming Model 2: Mission Specificity
Number of obs = 268
F( 12, 255) =
7.91
Prob > F =
0.00

Robust Regression

Acceleration Gaming

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

Percent Low Income
Percent Black
Mission Specificity
Performance Grade
Size
Climate
Performance Use
Lack of Resources

0.0075532
0.0097233
-0.437538
0.0618169
-7.91E-06
0.1309105
-0.5930932
-0.1071792

0.0029605
0.0021445
0.1500164
0.0618215
0.0000563
0.1299469
0.1578663
0.0963019

2.55
4.53
-2.92
1.00
-0.14
1.01
-3.76
-1.11

0.011
0.000
0.004
0.318
0.888
0.315
0.000
0.267

0.0017231
0.0055002
-0.7329668
-0.0599289
-0.0001188
-0.1249953
-0.9039809
-0.2968276

0.0133834
0.0139464
-0.1421092
0.1835627
0.000103
0.3868162
-0.2822054
0.0824691

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016

0.2400387
0.1188672
0.2064285
0.1734438

0.1681996
0.1626591
0.1638533
0.1729541

1.43
0.73
1.26
1.00

0.155
0.466
0.209
0.317

-0.0911985
-0.2014591
-0.1162496
-0.1671566

0.571276
0.4391935
0.5291065
0.5140442

_cons

0.9244459

0.9243253

1.00

0.318

-0.8958377

2.74473

179

[95% Conf. Interval]
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